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THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: A SELF-
EXECUTING TREATY
Gary B. Born*
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards—also known as the New York Convention—is the 
world’s most significant legislative instrument relating to international 
commercial arbitration. It currently has 159 Contracting States, including 
the United States, and provides a global constitutional charter for the 
international arbitral process. The Convention has enabled both national 
courts and arbitral tribunals to develop durable, effective means for 
enforcing international arbitration agreements and awards and has thereby 
facilitated the remarkable growth and success of international arbitration 
over the past 50 years.
Notwithstanding the Convention’s significance, there is surprising 
uncertainty whether the Convention, or any individual provision of the 
Convention, is “self-executing” under U.S. law and therefore directly 
applicable in American courts without the interposition of domestic 
implementing legislation. There is limited commentary in the United States 
addressing these issues in any detail, and, although a number of courts have 
treated the Convention as self-executing, other authorities have either 
concluded to the contrary or expressed confusion as to the Convention’s 
status.
The thesis of this Article is that uncertainty regarding the Convention’s 
status as a self-executing treaty of the United States is unwarranted and
unfortunate. Instead, both the Convention’s provisions for recognition and 
enforcement of arbitration agreements (in Article II) and of arbitral awards 
(in Articles III, IV, V, and VI) should be regarded as self-executing and 
directly applicable in U.S. (and other national) courts. As discussed in detail 
below, this is because Article II establishes mandatory, complete, and 
comprehensive substantive rules, directed specifically to national courts, for 
the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements. 
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Likewise, the history and purposes of the Convention, the language and 
legislative history of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA” or 
“Act”), and the practices of other Contracting States support the conclusion 
that Article II is directly applicable in American courts.
Similar analysis applies to Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the Convention. 
The text of these provisions, as well as their objects and purposes, also 
indicate that they were intended to apply directly in American courts. 
Likewise, a careful reading of Chapter 2 of the FAA and its legislative 
history indicates that the Convention’s provisions dealing with arbitral 
awards are self-executing and directly applicable in American courts.
It is important to the Convention’s success, particularly in the United 
States, that its self-executing status be recognized. If the Convention were 
not self-executing, there would be no basis for its application in U.S. state 
courts, which would likely place the United States in material breach of its 
international obligations under the Convention and produce highly unusual 
disparities in the treaty’s application in state and federal courts. Likewise, if 
the Convention were not self-executing, the application of some of its terms, 
including the critical provisions of Article II, might also be inapplicable in 
U.S. federal courts—again, placing the United States in violation of its 
international obligations. Moreover, treating the Convention as non-self-
executing would result in national courts—and particularly U.S. courts—
interpreting and applying disparate domestic arbitration statutes, rather than 
developing a uniform, harmonized interpretation of a single international 
instrument. This approach would materially undercut one of the 
Convention’s fundamental objectives: the establishment of uniform rules of 
international law governing the international arbitral process.
This Article examines the foregoing issues. Part I addresses the history, 
provisions, and purposes of the New York Convention. Part II considers 
whether the New York Convention is self-executing. This Part first analyzes 
whether Article II of the Convention is self-executing, addressing the text 
and purposes of Article II, the process leading to U.S. ratification of the 
Convention, the position of the U.S. government, and relevant national court 
decisions. It then addresses whether the Convention’s provisions concerning 
awards—in Articles III, IV, V, and VI—are self-executing and concludes 
that these provisions, like Article II, are directly applicable in American 
courts. Finally, Part III examines the implications of the Convention’s self-
executing status for the treaty’s role as the constitutional charter for 
international commercial arbitration in the United States and elsewhere.
I.  The New York Convention
The New York Convention is central to the legal regime applicable to 
international arbitration agreements and awards. The Convention prescribes 
mandatory, uniform international rules governing the recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards in 
Contracting States. The Convention also provides the foundation for most 
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national legislation governing the international arbitral process, which in 
turn gives effect to and elaborates upon the Convention’s basic principles.1
A. History and Objectives of the New York Convention
The New York Convention was adopted to address the needs of the 
international business community and to facilitate international trade and 
commerce.2 In particular, the Convention aimed to improve the legal regime 
provided by the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 (the 
“Geneva Protocol”) and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 (the “Geneva Convention”).3
The first draft of what became the Convention was prepared in 1953 by 
the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”).4 The ICC observed 
that “[t]he 1927 Geneva Convention . . . no longer entirely meets modern 
economic requirements” and introduced its draft of an improved treaty with 
the objective of establishing “a new international system of enforcement of 
arbitral awards.”5 The ICC draft,6 and a subsequent draft prepared by the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, provided the basis for a 
three-week conference in New York—the United Nations Conference on 
Commercial Arbitration (the “New York Conference”)—attended by 
delegates from 45 states in the Spring of 1958.7 The United States sent a 
delegation to attend the negotiating and drafting sessions at the Conference, 
but deliberately played a limited role in the proceedings.8
1. See generally 2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 
11.02, at 1535–36 (2d ed. 2014).
2. See Robert Briner, Philosophy and Objective of the Convention, in ENFORCING 
ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 
9, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2 (1999).
3. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 
1958, at 7 (1981) [hereinafter VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION].
4. Id. The International Chamber of Commerce’s (“ICC’s”) draft focused exclusively 
on the recognition of international arbitral awards. See GIORGIO GAJA, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION (1978); Int’l Chamber of 
Commerce, Report and Preliminary Draft Convention Adopted by the Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration at Its Meeting of 13 March 1953, reprinted in 9 ICC
INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 32, 32 (1998) [hereinafter ICC, Report].
5. ICC, Report, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. U.N. CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Final Act 
and Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at 3, ¶¶ 3–
4, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 (1958); History 1923 - 1958, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958 (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2018).
8. Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Aug. 15, 1958), reprinted in 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
91, 95 (2008) [hereinafter Delegation Report]. At the time, the U.S. Delegation was skeptical 
of the value of the proposed treaty and was largely uninvolved in negotiations. Id. at 95, 115–
18.
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The Conference ultimately produced a draft convention that came to be 
referred to as the New York Convention. The new draft was in many 
respects a radically innovative instrument: it created, for the first time, a 
comprehensive legal regime for the international arbitral process. Earlier 
drafts of the proposed treaty focused entirely on the enforcement of 
arbitral awards with no provisions addressing the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements. As one commentator summarizes the Convention’s 
drafting history:
Originally, it was the intention to leave the provisions concerning 
the formal validity of the arbitration agreement and the obligatory 
referral to arbitration to a separate protocol. At the end of the New 
York Conference of 1958, it was realized that this was not 
desirable. Article II [which dealt with arbitration agreements,] was 
drafted in a race against time, with, as a consequence, the omission 
of an indication as to which arbitration agreements the Convention 
would apply.9
This revised approach was eventually adopted,10 and the resulting provisions 
addressing the recognition of arbitration agreements form one of the central 
elements of the Convention. The extension of the draft to encompass both
arbitration agreements and awards made the Convention the first 
international instrument to comprehensively deal with all major elements of 
the arbitral process—from arbitration agreement to arbitral award.11
The New York Conference’s members approved and opened for 
signature the text of the Convention on June 10, 1958 by unanimous vote 
(with only the United States and three other states abstaining).12 The final 
version of the Convention was set forth in English, French, Spanish, 
Russian, and Chinese texts.13 The text of the Convention is only a few pages 
long, with seven concisely drafted provisions (Articles I through VII) 
containing the Convention’s essential terms.
Most of the remaining provisions of the Convention are of no relevance 
to the treaty’s self-executing status. One exception, however, is Article XI 
9. VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION, supra note 3, at 56.
10. See GEORGE HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE, MAY/JUNE 1958, at 21–28 (1958) [hereinafter HAIGHT, SUMMARY ANALYSIS].
11. 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1], at 100–02.
12. U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record of the 
Twenty-Fourth Meeting, at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.24 (Sept. 12, 1958). For a summary 
of these negotiations, see Pieter Sanders, The History of the New York Convention, Address at 
the Fourteenth Congress of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (May 
1998), in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40
YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 11 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 
1999).
13. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 
XVI, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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of the Convention, which addresses the Convention’s application in federal 
or non-unitary states, such as the United States.14 Article XI provides that, 
where the Convention’s provisions “come within the legislative jurisdiction 
of the federal authority,” then the Contracting State’s obligations will be no 
different from those of unitary or non-federal states.15 If, however, the 
Convention’s provisions “come within the legislative jurisdiction of 
constituent states or provinces[,]” then “the federal Government shall bring 
such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the 
appropriate authorities of constituent states or provinces at the earliest 
possible moment[.]”16 As discussed below, the United States has not taken 
the position that Article XI applies to it and has taken no action under 
Article XI(b),17 which requires notice and a favorable recommendation to 
constituent states.
B. Provisions of the New York Convention
The New York Convention’s provisions focus principally on 
establishing uniform international standards for the recognition of 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
subsequently observed, the Convention was designed to “encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to 
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory 
countries.”18 Although these observations are accurate, it is clear that the 
Convention also indirectly governs the arbitral process by requiring courts 
of Contracting States to recognize arbitration agreements—including their 
procedural terms—and to refuse to recognize awards if the parties’ agreed 
arbitral procedures have not been followed.19
Thus, the Convention’s provisions, taken together, prescribe binding 
international legal rules governing the entire arbitral process, including the 
recognition of arbitration agreements, the conduct of the arbitration itself, 
14. Christopher R. Drahozal, The New York Convention and the American Federal 
System, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 107–08 (2012) [hereinafter Drahozal, Convention]; see also 
Robert B. Looper, ‘Federal-State’ Clauses in Multi-Lateral Instruments, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 162 (1957).
15. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. XI(a).
16. Id. art. XI(b).
17. Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 108. The U.S. position regarding Article 
XI varies. See id. (noting that a later official description of Article XI was “very different”).
At no time, however, has the United States taken the position that it may invoke Article XI(b). 
NICHOLAS DEB KATZENBACH, LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 90-118, at 22 (2d 
Sess. 1968) [hereinafter KATZENBACH, LETTER]. 
18. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); see also Smith/Enron 
Cogeneration L.P. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting 
“the goal of simplifying and unifying international arbitration law.”).
19. See 2 BORN, supra note 1, § 11.03[C][1][c][ii], at 1549–50. 
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and the recognition of awards.20 These provisions, which are summarized 
below, have provided the basis for the development of a comprehensive, 
effective, and efficient legal regime for the international arbitration process.
1. Article II: Presumptive Validity of Arbitration Agreements
Central to the Convention is Article II(1), which establishes a basic, 
internationally-uniform rule of formal and substantive validity for 
arbitration agreements falling within the Convention’s scope. Article II(1) 
provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing 
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any 
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.21
Article II(3) elaborates on this basic rule and adds an enforcement 
mechanism, requiring the courts of Contracting States, when seized of a 
matter subject to arbitration, to refer the parties to arbitration unless their 
arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.”22 Article II(3) ensures that international arbitration agreements 
will, consistent with their basic objectives, be promptly and efficiently 
enforced in accordance with their terms by requiring the parties to arbitrate, 
rather than litigate, their underlying dispute.23
By virtue of Article II, international arbitration agreements are 
presumptively valid and enforceable, subject only to specifically defined 
international exceptions identified in Articles II(1) and II(3). The party 
opposing recognition of the agreement must prove the applicability of these 
exceptions.24 Under the Convention, Contracting States may not fashion 
additional, domestic grounds for denying recognition of agreements to 
arbitrate: as one appellate court explained, “[d]omestic defenses to 
arbitration are transferable to [the challenge to an arbitration agreement 
20. See 1 id. § 1.04[A][1][c], at 105–12.
21. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 1.
22. Id. art. II, ¶ 3.
23. 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][i], at 108–10; see also Gerald Aksen, 
American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
3 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1971) [hereinafter Aksen, American Arbitration Accession] (“[A] 
Treaty whereby international arbitration agreements and awards will be specifically, speedily, 
and uniformly enforceable in federal courts.”).
24. See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.04[B][4], at 749–50. In addition, Article II(1) 
provides for a non-arbitrability exception, allowing Contracting States to deny enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in matters “not capable of settlement by arbitration.” See 1 BORN,
supra note 1, § 6.02[A], at 946–47.
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under the Convention] only if they fit within the limited scope of defenses” 
permitted by Article II.25
Importantly, the Convention prescribes international choice-of-law 
rules that govern the selection of the law applicable to international 
arbitration agreements. These choice-of-law rules—set forth in Article 
V(1)(a) and impliedly in Article II—are one of the Convention’s crowning 
achievements.26 The Convention’s choice-of-law rules require Contracting 
States to give effect to the parties’ choice of law governing their agreement 
to arbitrate, and, in the absence of any express or implied choice by the 
parties, to apply the law of the arbitral seat, providing essential clarity with 
regard to the law applicable to the parties’ arbitration agreement.27
The Convention is also interpreted as imposing limits on the grounds of 
substantive invalidity that can be asserted against international arbitration 
agreements.28 In particular, courts and commentators have concluded that 
Article II(3) requires—as a mandatory international rule—the recognition of 
international arbitration agreements except where such agreements are 
25. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Suazo v. 
NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2016); Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 
675 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2012) (“ ‘[The Convention] expressly compels the federal 
courts to enforce arbitration agreements,’ notwithstanding jurisdiction conferred on such 
courts to adjudicate Seaman’s Wage Act claims.”) (quoting Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise 
Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)); Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 
270, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2002); Simon v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. G-13-0444, 2014 WL 
12617820, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2014); Greenberg v. Park Indem. Ltd., No. LA CV12-
10756 JAK (AJWx), 2013 WL 12123695, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013).
26. See 3 BORN, supra note 1, § 26.05[C][1][e][i], at 3462 (citing authorities). Article 
II does not itself expressly address the choice-of-law governing international arbitration 
agreements. It does, however, require Contracting States to recognize all material terms of 
such agreements, including the parties’ express and implied choice-of-law. Id. The better view 
is also that Article II impliedly incorporates Article V(1)(a)’s similar choice-of-law rule. Id.
27. See New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V, ¶ 1(a); id., art. II. Moreover, the 
better view is that the Convention also requires application of a validation principle reflecting 
the parties’ implied intentions to give effect to the parties’ arbitration agreement. See 1 BORN,
supra note 1, § 4.04[A][3], at 542–49. 
28. See, e.g., Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 372–73; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302; Rhone 
Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 
53–54 (3d Cir. 1983); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982); 
Alghanim v. Alghanim, 828 F. Supp. 2d 636, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Matthews v. Princess 
Cruise Lines, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329–31 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Hodgson v. Royal 
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that Article II 
permits non-recognition only for fraud “that can be applied neutrally on an international 
scale.”) (quoting Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302); Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice 
Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 610 F. Supp. 
2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Khan v. Parsons Glob. Servs., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 327, 339–40
(D.D.C. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 521 F.3d 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Prograph Int’l Inc. v. 
Barhydt, 928 F. Supp. 983, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Technetronics, Inc. v. Leybold-Geaeus 
GmbH, No. CIV. A. 93-1254, 1993 WL 197028, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1993) (declining to 
declare agreement null and void absent evidence of the “traditionally recognized international 
defenses such as fraud, duress or mistake.”).
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invalid under ordinary, generally-applicable principles of contract law (that 
is, when such agreements are “null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed”). These limits effectuate the Convention’s objective by 
ensuring that Contracting States recognize the validity of international 
arbitration agreements in accordance with uniform international standards.29
Under these standards, a Contracting State may not avoid its obligation 
to recognize international arbitration agreements by adopting rules of 
national law that single out such agreements for invalidity. Thus, national 
law provisions that impose unusual notice requirements (e.g., particular 
font), consent requirements (e.g., that arbitration agreements be specifically 
approved or established by heightened proof requirements), procedural 
requirements (e.g., only institutional arbitration agreements are valid), or 
invalidity rules (e.g., arbitration agreements applicable to future disputes, 
fraud claims, or tort claims are invalid) are all impermissible under Article 
II(3).30 As one U.S. appellate court emphasized, “[t]he limited scope of the 
Convention’s null and void clause ‘must be interpreted to encompass only 
those situations—such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver—that can be 
applied neutrally on an international scale.’”31 Other authorities adopt the 
same analysis of the Convention, either expressly or impliedly.32
Article II applies to, and requires recognition of, all material terms of 
international arbitration agreements. This includes the recognition of 
provisions regarding the choice of the arbitral seat, the selection of 
29. See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.06[B][1][a], at 838–41, § 5.02[D][1]–[3], [5], at 
719–22; see also Rhone Mediterranee, 712 F.2d at 53; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme 
court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 21, 2006, Appeals No. 05-21.818, Bull. civ. I, No. 502 
(Fr.); Dyna-Jet Pte Ltd. v. Wilson Taylor Asia Pac. Pte Ltd., [2016] SGHC 238 (Sing.).
30. See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.06[B][1][a], at 839.
31. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302 (quoting DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., 202 F.3d 71, 
80 (1st Cir. 2000)).
32. See Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 372–73; Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 
1278 (11th Cir. 2011) (refusing to recognize “a new public policy defense under Article II—
based on the elimination of a U.S. statutory claim under the Seaman’s Wage Act—[which] by 
definition could not be applied neutrally on an international scale, as each nation operates 
under different statutory laws and pursues different policy concerns.” (internal quotation 
omitted)); Authenment v. Ingram Barge Co., 878 F. Supp. 2d 672, 684–85 (E.D. La. 2012) 
(“[P]ublic policy defenses in Convention cases must be brought at the ‘award-enforcement 
stage’ rather than at the ‘arbitration-enforcement stage.’”); Lazarus v. Princess Cruise Lines, 
Ltd., No. 1:11-cv-22665-KMM, 2011 WL 6070294, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011); Hodgson 
v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 11-21046-CIV., 2011 WL 5005307, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 19, 2011) (“[A]n arbitration clause is null and void only if the arbitration agreement has 
been obtained through fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver.” (citation omitted)); W. Tankers 
Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454 [56–57] (Eng.); 
Sun Life Assurance Co. v. CX Reins., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 283 [2, 55] (Eng.); Westacre Inv., 
Inc. v. Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co., [1998] 3 WLR 770 [785–86], [2000] QB 288 (Eng.) 
(identifying examples where an arbitration agreement might be invalid, “such as fraud . . . ,
the effect of the statute rendering the underlying contract illegal, the absence of consensus ad 
idem, non est factum, mistake as to the person making the contract, and contracts adhesion in 
which the arbitrator is, in practice, the choice of the dominant party”).
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institutional rules, the choice of arbitrators, and arbitral procedures.33
Consequently, courts in Contracting States must enforce not just the parties’ 
exchange of commitments to arbitrate, but also give effect to the material 
terms of that agreement to arbitrate, pursuant to Article II’s internationally 
neutral standards.34 The overwhelming weight of national court authority is 
consistent with this analysis.35
2. Articles III, IV, and V: Presumptive Validity of Arbitral Awards
Equally central to the New York Convention are Articles III, IV, and V, 
which establish a basic international rule of validity and enforceability of 
foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards falling within the scope of the 
Convention.36 These obligations apply only to “foreign” awards—those 
made outside the Contracting State where the party seeks recognition of the 
award—and “non-domestic” awards—a category of awards with limited 
relevance in contemporary practice.37 For these two types of awards, Article 
III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as 
binding” and shall enforce such awards in accordance with the Convention 
and the recognition forum’s national procedural rules.38 In turn, Article IV 
prescribes streamlined procedures for the proof of foreign and non-domestic 
awards by the award-creditor, requiring only the presentation of translated 
copies of the award and underlying arbitration agreement.39 As with Article 
33. 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.01[B][2], at 641.
34. See id., § 8.02[A][1], at 1255–56.
35. See, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 690 
(10th Cir. 2004) (“Parties need not establish quasi-judicial proceedings resolving their 
disputes to gain the protections of the FAA, but may choose from a broad range of procedures 
and tailor arbitration to suit their peculiar circumstances.”); Sec. Ins. v. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d 
322, 325 (2d Cir. 2004) (“FAA requires ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
[the parties’] agreement.’”) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)); Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28
F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994); Lufuno Mphaphuli & Assocs. (Pty) Ltd. v. Andrews 2009 (4) 
SA 529 (CC) at 102 para. 217 (S. Afr.) (“[T]he identity of the arbitrator and the manner of the 
proceedings will ordinarily be determined by agreement between the parties.”); Bundesgericht 
[BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 12, 2003, DECISIONI DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE 
SVIZZERO [DTF] 4P.2/2003 I 3 (Switz.); Austria No. 10 of 1992, 22 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 619, 
625 (Austrian Sup. Ct.).
36. 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c], at 108–12. But cf. 3 BORN, supra note 1, § 
26.06[A], at 3719 (noting that Article VI of the Convention provides a limited exception to 
the obligation of courts of Contracting States to recognize foreign arbitral awards, allowing 
courts in the recognition forum to stay or suspend recognition proceedings if an application to 
annul the award has been filed in the arbitral seat).
37. 2 id. § 22.02[E][1][a], at 2942. Non-domestic awards are awards made in the state 
where recognition is sought, but which are not regarded as “domestic” awards by that state. In 
practice, very few Contracting States treat any awards made in their territory as non-domestic. 
Id.
38. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III.
39. Id. art. IV.
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II(3) and arbitration agreements, the purpose of Article IV is to ensure the 
speedy and efficient recognition of arbitral awards, giving effect to the 
parties’ underlying objectives in agreeing to finally resolve their disputes by 
arbitration.40
Finally, Article V provides that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of the 
award may be refused . . . only if” one of seven specified exceptions, set 
forth in Articles V(1) and V(2), applies.41 The Convention’s exceptions are 
limited to issues of jurisdiction (Articles V(1)(a) and V(1)(c)); procedural 
regularity and fundamental fairness (Article V(1)(b)); compliance with the 
procedural terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement or, absent such 
agreement, the procedural requirements of the arbitral seat (Article V(1)(d)); 
and public policy or non-arbitrability (Articles V(2)(a) and V(2)(b)). An 
award may also be denied recognition if a competent court in the arbitral 
seat annuls the award (Article V(1)(e)). Notably, these exceptions do not 
permit review by a recognition court of the merits of the arbitrators’ 
substantive decisions resolving the parties’ dispute.42
As with Article II, the provisions of Articles III, IV, and V are 
mandatory, not permissive—a conclusion that national courts and other 
authorities have uniformly confirmed.43 It is also clear that the exceptions 
set forth in Article V are exclusive: courts in Contracting States may not 
deny recognition of foreign or non-domestic awards except on one of the 
grounds listed in Article V.44 Moreover, consistent with the Convention’s 
40. See id. art. IV; 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][ii], at 110 (“Article IV 
prescribes streamlined procedures . . . .”); Aksen, American Arbitration Accession, supra note 
23, at 1 (prefacing that, under the Convention, “international arbitration agreements and 
awards will be specifically, speedily, and uniformly enforceable in federal courts.”). 
41. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V.
42. See generally 3 BORN, supra note 1, §26.05[C][12], at 3707–12.
43. See, e.g., Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court[] . . . must confirm the award unless one of the grounds for 
refusal specified in the Convention applies to the underlying award.”) (citation omitted); 
Rosseel N.V. v. Oriental Com. & Shipping Co. [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 625 (Comm) at 628 
(Eng.) (“If none of the grounds for refusal are present, the award ‘shall’ be enforced.”); 
Cayman Islands No. 2 of 1989, 15 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 436, 439 (Gambon Grand Ct.); see also 
Jan Paulsson, The New York Convention in International Practice – Problems of Assimilation,
in THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, at 100, 105 (Marc Blessing ed., ASA Special 
Series No. 9, 1996) (emphasis in original) (“The Convention imposes a clear obligation on
member States to enforce awards, if various conditions [set forth in Article IV] are 
fulfilled. . . . If the conditions are fulfilled, the award must be enforced unless one of the 
grounds for refusal of enforcement [set forth in Article V] exists.”).
44. See, e.g., Encyc. Universalis S.A. v. Encyc. Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 92 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (“[A] district court is strictly limited to the seven defenses under the New York 
Convention when considering whether to confirm a foreign award.”) (citations omitted); 
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 
288 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts in countries of secondary jurisdiction may refuse enforcement 
only on the grounds specified in Article V.”); Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. 
Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Gov’t [2010] UKSC 46 [101], [2010] 3 WLR 1472 
[1510] (Eng.) (“[Article V] grounds are exhaustive.”); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
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pro-enforcement objective, the burden of proof for resisting recognition and 
enforcement of an award under Article V is on the award-debtor, not the 
award-creditor, and national courts have emphasized that Article V’s 
exceptions must be strictly construed.45
3. Articles II and V(1)(d): Recognition of Parties’ Procedural Autonomy
The Convention also addresses, at least indirectly, the procedures used 
in international arbitrations. In particular, Articles II and V(1)(d) of the 
Convention both provide for recognition of the parties’ agreed arbitral 
procedures.46
As noted above, Articles II(1) and II(3) require Contracting States to 
recognize all of the material terms of agreements to arbitrate and to refer the 
parties to arbitration in accordance with those terms.47 Those provisions 
obligate courts in Contracting States to give effect to the arbitral procedures 
that the parties provide for in their arbitration agreements.48 The Convention 
impliedly permits Contracting States to deny effect to such agreements in 
limited, exceptional circumstances in order to protect the integrity of the 
arbitral process, but it does not otherwise limit the parties’ procedural 
autonomy.49
Article V(1)(d) similarly provides for non-recognition of awards where 
the “composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, 
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took 
place[.]”50 Even more explicitly than Article II, Article V(1)(d) gives 
priority to the parties’ agreement regarding arbitral procedures, providing 
for application of the law of the arbitral seat only as a default mechanism 
Supreme Court] July 28, 2010, DECISIONI DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE SVIZZERO [DTF] 
4A_233/2010 (Switz.); Belgium No. 10 of 1997, 22 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 643, 647 (Belg. App. 
Ct.).
45. See, e.g., Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Sys., Inc., 623 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Convention defenses are interpreted narrowly.”) (citations omitted); Ario v. Underwriting 
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“[C]ourts have strictly applied the Article V defenses and generally view[ed] them 
narrowly.”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Admart AG, 457 F.3d at 308); China 
Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 283 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that courts have “construed those exceptions narrowly.”) (citations omitted); Int’l
Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12, 28 (D.D.C. 
2011) (“[A] narrow reading of the New York Convention comports with the context in which 
the Convention was enacted . . . .”) (citation omitted); AO Techsnabexport v. Globe Nuclear 
Servs. & Supply, Ltd., 656 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (D. Md. 2009); FG Hemisphere Assoc. LLC 
v. Dem. Rep. Congo, [2008] H.K.C.F.I. 906 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
46. See 2 BORN, supra note 1, § 15.02[A], at 2131–32.
47. See supra Part I.B.1.
48. See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][iii], at 112.
49. Id.
50. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V, ¶ 1(d).
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when the parties have not made any agreement regarding procedural 
matters.51 Together, these provisions ensure that one of the central 
objectives of the arbitral process—facilitating the parties’ procedural 
autonomy—is realized.52
* * * * * * *
In sum, the various provisions of the Convention made a number of 
significant improvements to the Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention. 
Among other things, the Convention shifted the burden of proving the 
validity or invalidity of awards from the award-creditor to the award-debtor 
and mandated summary, expedited recognition procedures; recognized 
substantial party autonomy with respect to the arbitral 
procedures; prescribed choice-of-law rules for the law applicable to 
arbitration agreements and required their specific enforcement; and 
abolished the previous “double exequatur” requirement (which had required 
that awards be confirmed in the arbitral seat before being recognized 
abroad).53 The President of the New York Conference summarized the 
Convention’s improvements as follows:
[I]t was already apparent that the [Convention] represented an 
improvement on the Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider 
definition of the awards to which the Convention applied; it 
reduced and simplified the requirements with which the party 
seeking recognition or enforcement of an award would have to 
comply; it placed the burden of proof on the party against whom 
recognition or enforcement was invoked; it gave the parties greater 
freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the arbitration 
procedure; it gave the authority before which the award was sought 
to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the 
enforcement to give suitable security.54
The Convention’s provisions establish a robust legal framework for the 
international arbitral process. Consistent with the Convention’s objectives, 
national courts have held that these provisions mandate a uniform, “pro-
enforcement” regime that allows effective, efficient recognition and 
enforcement of both international arbitration agreements and awards. As 
one U.S. appellate court declared, “The purpose of the New York 
Convention . . . is to ‘encourage the recognition and enforcement of 
51. At the same time, Article V(1)(b) of the Convention also permits non-recognition 
of awards where a party was denied an opportunity to present its case, imposing a requirement 
of procedural fairness on the arbitral process. BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][iii], at 112.
52. See id.
53. Id. § 1.04[A][1], at 102.
54. U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record of the 
Twenty-Fifth Meeting, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.25 (Sept. 12, 1958).
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commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify 
the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral 
awards are enforced in the signatory countries.’”55 Other courts and 
commentators have adopted similar interpretations of the Convention’s 
“pro-enforcement” objectives with respect to both arbitration agreements56
and arbitral awards.57 In particular, despite the United States’ initial 
reluctance to ratify the Convention, U.S. courts have played a leading role 
in interpreting the Convention and ensuring the efficacy and efficiency of 
the international arbitral process, with foreign courts frequently relying on 
U.S. decisions.58
The Convention has been highly successful in achieving its objectives.59
The use of arbitration to resolve international commercial disputes increased 
55. Int’l Ins. v. Caja Nacional De Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)).
56. See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15; Repub. of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 
F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2011) (federal policy favoring arbitration “is even stronger in the
context of international business transactions”); Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Sys., Inc., 623 F.3d 
832, 841 (9th Cir. 2010) (“New York Convention was enacted to promote the enforceability 
of international arbitration agreements”); Société Bomar Oil N.V v. E.T.A.P, 1987 REV. ARB.
482, 485–86 (Ct. App. Paris 1987) (“facilitate dispute resolution by way of international 
commercial arbitration”); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] September 30, 
2010, 2011 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT [NJW-RR] 
569 (570) (Ger.) (“With the New York Convention, the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
should be facilitated internationally.”); Switzerland No. 8, 1986 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 532, 535 
(“The purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the resolution of disputes through 
arbitration”); IMC Aviation Sols Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC [2011] VSCA 248, ¶ 45, n.16 
(Austl.) (“Convention is widely recognised in international arbitration circles as having a ‘pro-
enforcement’ policy”).
57. See, e.g., Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“policy of favoring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards”); Bergesen v. Joseph 
Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983) (purpose of Convention is “to encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards.”) (citation omitted); Parsons 
& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 
969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974) (Convention’s “basic thrust was to liberalize procedures for enforcing 
foreign arbitral awards . . . .”); Dowans Holdings SA v. Tanzania Elec. Supply Co. [2011] 
EWHC (Comm) 1957 [10] (Eng.) (“intention of the New York Convention was to make 
enforcement of a Convention award more straightforward”); Bharat Aluminium v. Kaiser 
Aluminium, (2010) 9 SCC 552, ¶ 149 (India) (“The underlying motivation of the New York 
Convention was to reduce the hurdles and produce a uniform, simple and speedy system for 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award.”); Italy No. 104, 1988 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 498, 499 
(“New York Convention clearly aimed at making the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
easier”); Singapore No. 1, 1995 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 771, 779 (“principle of comity of nations 
requires that the awards of foreign arbitration tribunals be given due deference and be 
enforced unless exceptional circumstances exist”).
58. A number of U.S. decisions under the Convention have been influential in non-U.S. 
courts, including Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985); Scherk, 417 U.S. 506; Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d 969; see BORN, supra note 1,
§ 2.03[B][1][b][i], at 299–300; id. § 5.01[C][2], at 644–46.
59. Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., [2010] S.C.R. 649, 657 (Can.) (“great 
success”); see BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][b], at 103; Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: 
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dramatically over the past fifty years,60 with observers describing arbitration 
as the predominant means of resolving international commercial disputes.61
The Convention has been central to these developments, providing the 
foundation for contemporary international commercial arbitration and one 
of the pillars of today’s broader international legal system.
C. U.S. Ratification of the New York Convention62
Following the adoption of the Convention in 1958, the U.S. delegation 
to the New York Conference initially recommended against U.S. ratification 
of the treaty, asserting that this was necessary to avoid potential conflicts 
between the Convention and existing U.S. law.63 That recommendation was 
followed for the next decade, with the United States taking no steps to ratify 
the Convention, notwithstanding the accessions of a number of other major 
trading states.64
The position of the United States “changed as the nation’s transnational 
commerce increased.”65 On June 10, 1968, exactly ten years after the 
History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43, 49 (1989) (The Convention “has been the “most 
effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of commercial law.”); J. 
Gillis Wetter, The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An 
Appraisal, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 91, 93 (1990) (“single most important pillar on which the 
edifice of international arbitration rests”).
60. See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 94; TOWARD A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, 341 app. 1 (Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005).
61. See France No. 35, 2005 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 499, 502 (Ct. App. Paris) (“usual 
means”); Messrs. Eckhardt & Co. v. Mohammad Hanif, (1993) 1 PLD (SC) 42, 52 (Pak.) 
(“very common nowadays”); Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public 
Policy and International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (“ ‘the’ ordinary and normal 
method”) (emphasis in original).
62. For commentary on the U.S. ratification of the Convention, see Leonard V. 
Quigley, Acceuission by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961) 
[hereinafter Quigley, Accession by the United States]; see also Aksen, American Arbitration 
Accession, supra note 23; Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 102–04.
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1 (1970) (“Although the United States participated 
in the [New York] [C]onference, the convention was not signed on behalf of our government 
at that time because the American delegation felt that certain provisions were in conflict with 
some of our domestic laws.”). 
64. Between 1958 and 1968, 33 states acceded to the Convention, including France, 
Germany, and Switzerland. Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
65. Louis Del Duca & Nancy A. Welsh, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration 
Agreements and Awards: Application of the New York Convention in the United States, 62 
AM. J. COMP. L. 69, 70 (2014); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-10, at 5, 7 (2d Sess. 1968) 
(statement of Richard D. Kearney) [hereinafter 1968 Kearney Statement] (“Our failure to 
become a party to the convention has resulted in difficulties for American businessmen 
seeking to enforce arbitral awards against parties located in foreign countries” and that he was 
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Convention was opened for signature, President Johnson signed the 
Convention and submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent.66 U.S. 
international businesses and the legal profession strongly supported U.S. 
ratification, emphasizing the importance of international arbitration to cross-
border trade and investment.67 Virtually no opposition was recorded to the 
Convention, including from the Department of State, which previously 
opposed U.S. accession.68 As discussed below, in addition to supporting 
ratification of the Convention, the Departments of State and Justice also 
recommended federal implementing legislation to ensure effective 
application of the Convention in U.S. courts.69
After receiving the Senate’s consent—by a vote of 57-0 —President 
Nixon ratified the Convention in 1970.70 At the same time, Congress 
enacted Chapter 2 of the FAA, which added eight sections to the Act 
addressing various procedural aspects of the Convention’s application in 
U.S. federal courts.71 The new provisions of Chapter 2 included sections on 
federal subject matter jurisdiction, venue, removal, injunctive authority, and 
similar ancillary matters.72 Chapter 2 supplemented the original FAA, 
enacted in 1925, which addressed, in a skeletal and relatively archaic 
fashion, the enforcement of domestic and some international arbitration 
agreements and awards.73 After the enactment of Chapter 2 of the FAA, the 
instrument of the accession of the United States to the Convention was filed 
not aware of “any indication that any segment of the community is opposed to this 
convention”).
66. 114 CONG. REC. 10487–88 (1968) (message of President Johnson).
67. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2 (1970) (House Judiciary Committee reporting receipt 
of “a number of communications from lawyers and businessmen urging early and favorable 
action on [the Senate bill to enact Chapter 2 of the FAA], and so far as is known, there is no 
opposition to the bill. It has the support of the American Bar Association, the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, the American Arbitration Association, the Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, Office and 
Professional Employees International Union, the Department of State, the Department of 
Justice, and the Bureau of the Budget.”).
68. See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5 (“[T]here was no known 
opposition to the convention in the business or the foreign trade community . . . . [T]he 
Secretary of State should recommend to the President that the Convention be sent to the 
Senate for its advice and consent.”).
69. See infra note 139.
70. 114 CONG. REC. 29605 (1968); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, at 2560, Dec. 11. 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
71. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012); see also infra Part. II.B.3.A; Drahozal, 
Convention, supra note 14, at 104, 107–11.
72. 9 U.S.C. §§ 202–203 (federal subject matter jurisdiction), 204 (venue), 205 
(removal), 206 (injunctive authority) and 207 (statute of limitations) (2012). 
73. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). The domestic FAA, now contained in a retitled 
“Chapter 1” of the Act, has only been amended in minor respects since 1925. See LARRY E.
EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 4 (3d ed. 2010); Imre S. Szalai, The
Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
319, 353–57 (2007).
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with the United Nations on September 30, 1970, and the Convention entered 
into force for the United States on December 29, 1970.74
II.  The New York Convention Is Self-Executing
Despite the New York Convention’s importance, there is a degree of 
uncertainty in the United States about whether it is self-executing and 
directly applicable in national court proceedings. One U.S. appellate 
decision concluded, with limited analysis, that Article II of the Convention 
is not self-executing,75 and dicta of the Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas
arguably suggests that Article V of the Convention is not self-executing 
either.76 In contrast, other U.S. authorities, at both the federal and state level, 
instead hold that various provisions of the Convention, and in some cases 
the Convention itself, are self-executing.77 Some observers, including the 
current version of the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International 
Commercial and Investment Arbitration (the “Restatement”), take no 
position at all on the matter,78 concluding that the Convention’s status is in 
“murky waters . . . .”79
74. U.S. Accedes to Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 63 DEP’T ST. BULL. 598, 
598 (1970).
75. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995).
76. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008); see also Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
77. See infra note 79 (citing authorities); see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, J., concurring) (“I
would hold that the relevant treaty provision, Article II of the Convention, is self-
executing . . . .”); Martin v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s London, No. SACV10–1298
AG(AJWx), 2011 WL 13227729, at *5–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (holding that the relevant 
provision in Article II of the Convention is self-executing). Both federal and state courts have 
repeatedly applied provisions of the Convention directly, without expressly holding that the 
Convention is self-executing. See, e.g., Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 
737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A, 57 N.Y.2d 408, 
414–16 (N.Y. 1982); Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 980 
N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531 
N.Y.S.2d 547, 550–52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Faberge Int’l Inc. v. Di Pino, 491 N.Y.S.2d 
345, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Shah v. E. Silk Indus. Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1985); CanWest Glob. Commc’ns Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 
549, 562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Composite Concepts Co. v. Berkenhoff GmbH, No. 
CA2009-11-149, 2010 WL 2371991, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2010).
78. See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-
2 reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (“[W]hether [Article 
II(3) of the Convention] is self-executing is unresolved.”).
79. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 387–88 (4th Cir. 2012); see also
Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 116 (“relationship between the New York 
Convention and state arbitration law in the United States is not at all settled.”). There is 
limited commentary on the Convention’s status. See S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution 
Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory Interpretation in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 514, 571 (2013) (“judicial analyses of the 
self-executing nature of the New York Convention are limited and in conflict”); Angela D. 
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Despite this uncertainty, the status of the Convention—as self-
executing or non-self-executing—has substantial theoretical and practical 
significance in the United States and elsewhere. If the Convention were self-
executing, then its terms would apply directly in both U.S. federal and state 
courts,80 ensuring that the United States’ commitments to recognize and 
enforce international arbitration agreements and awards are fully honored 
and realizing the Convention’s objective of facilitating the arbitral process. 
In contrast, if the Convention were non-self-executing, then its terms would 
not apply directly in either state or federal courts. As a consequence, 
international arbitration agreements and awards would be subject to a 
confusing array of different and uncertain legal rules in different American 
courts,81 with, on any view, state law being applicable to significant 
categories of such agreements and awards in U.S. state courts.82 As 
discussed below, the shortcomings resulting from this approach are 
illustrated by the difficulties that arise from the Restatement’s efforts to 
prescribe rules of U.S. international arbitration law without treating the 
Convention as self-executing.83 Finally, if the Convention is not regarded as 
self-executing, then the McCarran-Ferguson Act arguably overrides Chapter 
2 of the FAA.84
Krupar, Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Intersection with Foreign Insurance 
Companies, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 883 (2010); Brooke L. Myers, Note, Treaties and Federal 
Question Jurisdiction: Enforcing Treaty-Based Rights in Federal Court, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1449, 1499 (2007). Compare Conor Colasurdo, Note, Preventing Reverse-Preemption of the 
United States’ Obligations Under the New York Convention, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 941, 
971–75 (2013) (“Article II of the New York Convention should be treated as self-executing”), 
and Douglas D. Reichert, Note, Provisional Remedies in the Context of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 368 (1986) (arguing that Article II(3) of the 
Convention is self-executing), with Campbell McLachlan, Are National Courts and 
International Arbitral Tribunals in Two Worlds or One?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 
587 (2016) (“Article II (3) . . . is not self-executing.”), David A. Rich, Deference to the “Law 
of Nations”: The Intersection between the New York Convention, the Convention Act, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and State Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 81, 104–12 (2010) [hereinafter Rich, Deference] (arguing that Convention is non-self-
executing), Alexander Kamel, Note, Cooperative Federalism: A Viable Option for 
Implementing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 102 GEO. L.J. 1821, 
1833–34 (2014) (“Convention is not self-executing.”), Amber A. Ward, Note, Circumventing 
the Supremacy Clause? Understanding the Constitutional Implications of the United States’
Treatment of Treaty Obligations Through an Analysis of the New York Convention, 7 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 491, 508 n.115 (2006) (“New York Convention is a non-self-executing 
treaty.”).
80. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
81. See infra Appendix A.
82. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
83. See infra Part II.C.3.
84. See authorities cited supra note 79 & infra notes 288–92. The McCarran-Ferguson 
Act provides that certain state laws regulating insurance reverse-preempt inconsistent “Acts of 
Congress,” but not U.S. treaties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012). 
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This Part argues that, despite the uncertainty currently surrounding the 
issue, both Article II of the Convention, dealing with arbitration agreements, 
and Articles III, IV, V, and VI, dealing with arbitral awards, are best 
considered as self-executing treaty provisions, directly applicable in U.S. 
and other domestic courts. That conclusion is true for both sets of provisions 
for closely related reasons.
A. Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Provisions
As a treaty of the United States, the New York Convention is the 
“supreme Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.85 Under the Constitution, treaties of the United States are a sui 
generis category of law, with different characteristics than other types of 
U.S. law. In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court’s leading treatment of 
the treaty power, the Court held that treaties are different from Acts of 
Congress, with distinct legal consequences.86 Among other things, a treaty is 
negotiated and made by the President pursuant to his authority over the 
Nation’s foreign affairs and the Treaty Clause of Article II,87 rather than by 
both houses of Congress under Article I’s provisions for enacting federal 
legislation.88 Similarly, as the Court held in Missouri v. Holland, a treaty 
may prescribe federal law regarding issues that do not otherwise fall within 
Congress’ Article I legislative authority.89 And in construing a treaty, the 
views of foreign courts and treaty partners have particular weight, whereas 
these sources play no role in construing a U.S. statute.90
Under long-standing U.S. authority, there is an important distinction 
between “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” treaties. A self-
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431–34 (1920). The Court distinguished 
between Acts of Congress and treaties: “Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land 
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when 
made under the authority of the United States.” Id.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur . . . .”). The Treaty Clause grants the President the power to “make” treaties, 
while requiring the President to obtain the “advice and consent” of the Senate in doing so. Id.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization 
of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1908 (2015) (“The treatymaking process 
is different from the process of passing legislation.”) [hereinafter Sitaraman & Wuerth, 
Normalization]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause 
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 615–16 (2008) [hereinafter 
Vázquez, Treaties as Law].
89. In Holland, the Supreme Court upheld legislation implementing a U.S. treaty 
against constitutional challenge. The Court held the Treaty Clause granted constitutional 
authority even where Article I did not, and that this authority was a sufficient basis for 
subsequent implementing legislation. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431–34. 
90. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
306 cmts. a, e reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2018); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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executing treaty has direct, binding effect in U.S. courts and “operates of 
itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”91 In contrast, and 
notwithstanding the unqualified text of the Supremacy Clause,92 a “non-self-
executing” treaty is not ordinarily directly applicable in U.S. courts. It must 
be “executed” by Congress through implementing legislation that provides 
the applicable rules of decision in U.S. courts.93 In addition, the distinction 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties can apply to 
individual provisions of treaties: within a single treaty, some provisions may 
be self-executing, whereas other provisions of the same treaty are non-self-
executing.94 Although commentators criticize the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties,95 the Supreme Court and other 
U.S. courts uniformly continue to apply the doctrine.96
As contemplated by the Supremacy Clause, a self-executing treaty has 
many of the same effects in U.S. courts as a federal statute.97 Self-executing 
treaties preempt inconsistent state law in the same manner as an Act of 
Congress.98 Similarly, a self-executing treaty will supersede prior federal 
91. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008); GARY B. BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 16 (6th ed., 2018) [hereinafter BORN & RUTLEDGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION].
92. The Supremacy Clause provides, in unqualified terms, that all “Treaties” are the 
“supreme Law of the Land” without any reference to “self-executing” or “non-self-executing”
treaties. Despite this text, the Supreme Court has held since the early 19th century that only 
“self-executing” treaties prescribe rules of federal law applicable in U.S. courts. See Whitney 
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–15; see also Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113, 
1129 (1992) [hereinafter Vázquez, Rights and Remedies]; Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra 
note 88, 605–06; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 577–78 (2007).
93. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514.
94. See Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is far 
from uncommon for a treaty to contain both self-executing and non-self-executing 
provisions.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 n.35 (5th Cir. 
1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
95. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 760 
(1988); Vázquez, Rights and Remedies, supra note 92, at 1113–14.
96. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 850–51 (2014); Medellín, 552 U.S. 
at 504–05; United States v. M.H. Pulaski Co. (The Five Percent Disc. Cases), 243 U.S. 97, 
105–06 (1917); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1890); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; 
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410–11, 429–30 (1886); Edye v. Roberston (The 
Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884); Am. Ins. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 
(1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
97. As noted above, the Supremacy Clause categorizes treaties as the supreme Law of 
the Land, in terms equivalent to the Constitution and federal legislation. See supra note 85;
see also Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 88, at 622.
98. See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (“[T]he treaty-making power is 
independent of and superior to the legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty 
provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with 
state legislation and when so ascertained must prevail over inconsistent state enactments.”)
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legislation (and be superseded by subsequent federal legislation) under the 
“last in time” rule.99 And like a federal statute, a self-executing treaty will 
provide the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction under the “arising 
under” provisions of the Constitution and federal legislation.100 In contrast, a 
non-self-executing treaty will have none of these effects unless 
implemented by federal legislation; it will not preempt state law, supersede 
federal legislation, or provide the basis for “arising under” jurisdiction.101
Distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties 
involves consideration of a number of factors directed at ascertaining the 
intentions of the federal political branches regarding a treaty’s status. In the 
words of the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States: “In assessing whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts 
consider whether the provision would have been intended or understood by 
the U.S. treatymakers to be directly enforceable by the courts, in light of the 
considerations relevant to the doctrine of self-execution.”102
As with other issues of treaty (and statutory) interpretation, the 
language of a treaty is central to determining whether or not it is self-
executing.103 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that determining whether a 
(citations omitted); Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1946) (“A
treaty lawfully entered into stands on the same footing of supremacy as does the Constitution 
and Laws of the United States.”) (citation omitted).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“An act of Congress and a self-executing treaty of the 
United States are of equal status in United States law, and in case of inconsistency the later in 
time prevails.”).
100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
101. See generally Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913); 
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952); see 
also Roger P. Alford, Judicial Barriers to the Enforcement of Treaties, in SUPREME LAW OF 
THE LAND?: DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 333 (Gregory H. Fox et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter FOX ET AL.,
SUPREME LAW].
102. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018). Some commentators suggest that, 
although the intent of U.S. treatymakers is relevant and entitled to deference, the 
treatymakers’ intent is not binding. See Michael D. Ramsey, A Textual Approach to Treaty 
Non-Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1639, 1660–61 (2016); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Four 
Problems with the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L.
REV. 1747, 1770–74 (2016). The Restatement (Fourth) and weight of judicial authority focus, 
however, on the intentions of the U.S. political branches do not give decisive weight to the 
views or intentions of other states.
103. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 497, 519 (2008) (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-
executing when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the 
agreement to have domestic effect.”).
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treaty provision is self-executing “begins with its text.”104 In doing so, the 
Court emphasized the importance of examining whether the treaty provision 
includes mandatory language, such as the terms “shall” or “must[,]” and 
whether the provision constitutes “a directive to domestic courts,” as 
distinguished from the legislative and executive branches.105 Relatedly, the 
extent to which treaty provisions are specific and comprehensive, rather 
than aspirational or partial, is also relevant to the provision’s self-executing 
status.106
In addition to treaty text, a number of other factors are relevant to 
determining whether a treaty is self-executing. These factors include the 
character of the agreement and the content of the rights that it confers;107
statements in the U.S. ratification process;108 the content of related 
agreements;109 and the post-ratification views of the United States.110 There 
appears to be no presumption that treaties or other U.S. international 
agreements either are or are not self-executing.111 Some early authorities 
suggested a presumption that treaties are self-executing112 based on the 
federal political branches’ presumed desire to ensure treaty compliance by 
the United States.113 More recently, however, the Supreme Court arguably 
104. Id. at 506. 
105. Id. at 508 (Article 94 of the U.N. Charter is non-self-executing because it “is not a 
directive to domestic courts[,]” and “does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or ‘must’
comply with an ICJ decision . . . .”); see also Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–15 (holding treaty 
provision non-self-executing based on its text).
106. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 5. 
107. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]oes it concern the 
adjudication of traditional private legal rights such as rights to own property, to conduct a 
business, or to obtain civil tort recovery? If so, it may well address itself to the judiciary.”); 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 110 reporters’ note 10 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2017) (“Courts also have been more likely to find self-execution when treaty provisions 
address matters of individual or private rights as opposed to the rights of the state.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 
reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Provisions in treaties of friendship, commerce, and 
navigation . . . conferring rights on foreign nationals.”).
108. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (“[W]hereas the Senate has issued declarations of 
non-self-execution when ratifying some treaties, it did not do so with respect to the United 
Nations Charter.”) (footnote omitted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h (“[A]ccount must 
be taken of any statement by the President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it to 
the Senate for consent or to the Congress.”).
109. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517–18.
110. See id. at 506–07.
111. See id. at 512–14; id. at 551–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing factors bearing 
on whether a treaty is self-executing); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 3 (AM.
LAW INST. 2018). See infra notes 114 & 115.
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141(1)(a), (2)(a) (1965); Ingrid Wuerth, 
Self-Execution, in FOX ET AL., SUPREME LAW, supra note 101, at 148, 150–51.
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201 (2d ed. 1996).
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rejected this view,114 with commentary now observing that “[t]he case law 
has not established a presumption for or against self-execution.”115
It is well-settled under U.S. law that “[w]hether [a treaty] is or is not 
self-executing in the law of another state party to the agreement is not 
controlling for the United States.”116 This is in part because not all nations 
distinguish between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties in the 
same manner that U.S. law does, making their treatment of a treaty of little 
relevance to the status of the treaty under U.S. law.117 In the United 
Kingdom, for example, treaties are generally non-self-executing and require 
domestic legislation to have effect in U.K. courts.118 Conversely, the 
Netherlands and some other civil law jurisdictions directly incorporate most 
treaties into domestic law without parliamentary approval.119 More 
fundamentally, the positions of foreign states regarding a treaty’s character 
are not determinative for purposes of U.S. law because the intentions of the 
U.S. political branches in ratifying the treaty are regarded as decisive for a 
treaty’s self-executing status as a matter of U.S. law.120
Nonetheless, the publicly held views of other Contracting States 
regarding a treaty’s meaning can provide indirect evidence of how, absent 
contrary indication by the United States, the United States understands the 
same treaty. In ratifying a treaty, the United States undertakes international 
obligations, defined by the treaty’s terms, whose content is materially 
114. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–16.
115. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 3; see also Wuerth, Self-Execution,
in FOX ET AL., SUPREME LAW, supra note 101, at 148, 148–149; Vázquez, Treaties as Law,
supra note 88.
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h. 
117. See id. § 111 reporters’ note 5 (“[F]ew other states distinguish between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties.”).
118. Ian Sinclair et al., Chapter 19: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 733 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005) (“Generally speaking, in the United 
Kingdom . . . no treaty is self-executing”).
119. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Jan. G. Brouwer, Chapter 14: 
The Netherlands, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 483 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. 
eds., 2005); see also David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE 
TO TREATIES, 386–87 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012), (“[C]ourts in Germany, Poland and the 
Netherlands . . . generally hold that treaty provisions designed to benefit private parties are 
invokable by private parties and directly applicable by the courts”).
120. See Medellín, 522 U.S. at 521 (“Our cases simply require courts to decide whether 
a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that 
confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 
(5th Cir. 1979); Robinson v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1017 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Diggs v. 
Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h.
The fact that a treaty is non-self-executing (and not directly applicable) as a matter of 
U.S. domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obligations under 
international law. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310(1) (“Whether a treaty provision is self-
executing concerns how the provision is implemented domestically and does not affect the 
obligation of the United States to comply with it under international law.”).
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affected by the interpretations of those terms by foreign states and other 
international authorities.121 The content of those obligations is necessarily 
one of the factors that bear on the understanding and intentions of the U.S. 
political branches regarding the self-executing character of a treaty.122
B. Article II Is Self-Executing
Applying the standards outlined above for determining the self-
executing character of U.S. treaties, there is substantial evidence that Article 
II of the Convention is self-executing. That conclusion is supported by the 
language, object, and purposes of Article II. It is confirmed by the terms of 
Chapter 2 of the FAA, the ratification and legislative history of both the 
Convention and Chapter 2, the weight of authority in U.S. state and federal 
courts considering the status of Article II, and the position of the U.S. 
government.
1. Text of Article II
The starting point for analysis of the Convention’s status, as the 
Supreme Court has emphasized,123 is the text of Article II. That text argues 
fairly clearly for self-executing status. Article II(1) provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing 
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any 
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.124
Article II(3) then gives effect to Article II(1), providing:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a 
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement 
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the 
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.125
These provisions plainly set forth binding substantive rules of international 
law, requiring that international arbitration agreements “shall” be 
121. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 306; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 325.
122. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 cmts. c, d, reporters’ note 4 (“[T]he nature of the 
international obligations assumed by the United States informs the question whether a treaty 
provision is self-executing,” although this issue is ultimately governed by U.S., not 
international, law).
123. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 (“[I]nterpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a 
statute, begins with its text.”).
124. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
125. Id. art. II, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
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recognized and that parties to such agreements “shall” be referred to 
arbitration. Consistent with this text, U.S. and other courts have uniformly 
held that Article II imposes mandatory international rules.126
The text of Article II provides weighty evidence that these provisions 
are self-executing. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the 
use of mandatory terms, including “shall,” are strong indications that a 
treaty is self-executing.127 These decisions rest on the premise that, where a 
treaty imposes clear-cut, mandatory obligations on the United States, the 
U.S. treaty-makers presumptively intend those obligations to be 
immediately complied with, consistent with the text and objectives of the 
Supremacy Clause. Here, Article II, as both a textual matter and as 
interpreted by U.S. and foreign courts, is unequivocally mandatory.
Article II is also directed specifically to national courts rather than to 
legislative or executive authorities. That is most apparent from Article 
II(3)’s direction to “the court[s] of a Contracting State,” requiring those 
courts to “refer the parties to arbitration”128—an action that only a court 
“seized of an action” can perform.129 Article II(1) is not materially different 
in requiring “Contracting States” to “recognize” arbitration agreements. 
Rather than the “recognition” being an action performed by other 
governmental authorities, it is characteristically and necessarily performed 
by national courts, where dispute resolution agreements are invoked and 
126. See, e.g., Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 
556 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir. 2009) (“nothing discretionary about Article II(3)”) (quoting 
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974)); InterGen 
N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[E]nforcing arbitration clauses under the 
New York Convention is an obligation, not a matter committed to district court discretion.”)
(citations omitted); Smith/Enron Cogeneration L.P. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 
F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he courts of a signatory to the Convention should abide by its 
goal of enforcing international agreements to arbitrate disputes.”); CanWest Glob. Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 549, 562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Hi-Fert Pty 
Ltd v. Kiukiang Mar Carriers Inc, (1998) 86 FCR 374, 393 (Austl.) (“[c]ourt must stay the 
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration”); The Rena K [1979] QB 377, 393 (Eng.) 
(“Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975, giving effect to [Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention], compels the recognition and enforcement of convention (i.e., non-domestic) 
arbitration agreements”); see also supra Part I.B.1.
127. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508; Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340–42 (1924) 
(“shall have”; “shall receive”); Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800–801
(2d Cir. 1971) (treaty is “absolute and mandatory[.]”).
128. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346–47 (2006) (“[W]here a treaty 
provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is no issue of intruding on the constitutional 
prerogatives of the States or the other federal branches. Courts must apply the remedy as a 
requirement of federal law.”) (citation omitted).
129. National legislative and executive branch officials cannot readily be characterized 
as being “seized of an action.” In the United States, in particular, it is courts, not Congress or 
the Executive Branch, that are seized of civil “action[s]” and can “refer” parties to arbitration. 
Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 112 (noting “strong argument that at least one 
provision [Article II(3)] of the Convention is self-executing.”).
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where Article II(3)’s enforcement mechanism expressly applies.130 Thus, 
Article II’s provisions are not only mandatory but are also “directive[s] to 
domestic courts,” which is regarded as powerful evidence of self-executing 
status.131
It is also significant that the provisions of Article II are complete and 
comprehensive, requiring nothing further to be applied in national courts in 
order to effectuate the Convention’s purposes.132 National courts can apply 
these provisions directly to give effect to arbitration agreements and refer 
parties to arbitration—as Article II mandates—without any need for further 
substantive elaboration or detail.133 No additional substantive terms, beyond 
the obligations to recognize arbitration agreements and to refer parties to 
arbitration, are needed for Article II to fulfill its intended objectives.
This is confirmed by the language of arbitration statutes to implement 
the Convention enacted in a number of Contracting States where treaties are 
not self-executing. In all these statutes, the provisions implementing Article 
II repeat virtually verbatim the text of Article II, adding nothing to the 
Convention’s terms. For example, approximately 80 countries base their 
arbitration legislation on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”).134 Articles 7 and 8 
of the Model Law mirror Articles II(1) and II(3) of the Convention, 
providing that “[a] court before which an action is brought in a matter which 
130. One commentator suggested that Article II(1) imposes a “discretionary 
commitment on the part of the United States to take future legislative action.” Rich, 
Deference, supra note 79, at 107. That suggestion is wrong for multiple reasons, including 
because Article II(1) is plainly mandatory (“Each Contracting State shall . . . .”); because the 
concept of a “discretionary commitment” is unknown in international law; and because U.S. 
and other judicial authority is contrary to any such interpretation of Article II. See supra and
infra Part II.B.
131. One commentator suggested that the Convention’s references to “Contracting 
States” implies non-self-executing status. Rich, Deference, supra note 79, 106–08. That 
analysis ignores the text of Article II(3) and misreads the remainder of Article II. The actions 
required by Article II (and, as discussed below, Articles III, IV, V and VI, see infra Part 
II.C.1) are judicial in nature and fairly clearly directed to national courts, rather than to 
political branches.
132. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
310 reporters’ notes 4, 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“courts focus on whether a treaty provision 
is appropriate for direct judicial application”; courts “will consider whether the treaty 
provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory to be suitable for direct application by the 
judiciary”); see also British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1161 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (treaty provisions “require no legislation or administrative regulations to 
implement them”) (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
133. U.S. courts have routinely interpreted and directly applied Article II of the 
Convention. See infra Part II.B.5.
134. U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]; Status, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
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is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall . . . refer the parties to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
incapable of being performed.”135 These provisions, as well as cognate 
provisions of other national arbitration statutes,136 confirm that Article II 
requires no further text or implementation to be fully effective in 
Contracting States.
As discussed below, the FAA’s terms confirm that Article II is self-
executing for similar reasons.137 In contrast to non-self-executing treaty 
provisions whose substantive terms must be implemented by federal 
legislation, nothing in Chapter 2 of the FAA repeats or restates the 
substantive terms of Article II as U.S. law. In particular, there is no 
provision in Chapter 2 giving effect to either Article II(1) or II(3) of the 
Convention, mandating the validity of arbitration agreements and requiring 
their enforcement by orders referring parties to arbitration.138 Instead, the 
FAA contains only ancillary provisions regarding subject matter 
jurisdiction, removal, venue, and similar procedural issues, none of which 
restate or make the substantive terms of Article II applicable in American 
courts.139
The U.S. government has made this point in submissions to the 
Supreme Court. In particular, the U.S. government has explained that 
Articles II(1) and II(3) do not “envisage that steps beyond ratification [of 
the Convention] are necessary before the Convention creates binding
135. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 8, ¶ 1.
136. Similarly, sections 6 and 9 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 impose almost 
identical obligations. The Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 6(1) (“In this Part an ‘arbitration 
agreement’ means an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future disputes (whether 
they are contractual or not).”), § 9(1) (“A party to an arbitration agreement against whom 
legal proceedings are brought (whether by way of claim or counterclaim) in respect of a 
matter which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration may (upon notice to the other 
parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in which the proceedings have been brought to 
stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter.”), § 9(4) (“On an application under 
this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null 
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.”); see also Arbitration Ordinance, 
(2013) Cap. 609, 7, § 20(1) (H.K.); Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA 
CODE (1996) §§ 44–45; Arbitration Act, Act No. 138 of 2003, art. 14 (Japan); Arbitration Act, 
2002, ch. 10, § 8 (Sing.).
137. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
138. See supra Part II.B.1.
139. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 (subject matter jurisdiction), 204 (venue), 205 (removal), 206 
(injunctive power) (2012). The legislative history of the FAA confirms that Chapter 2 was 
regarded as serving these ancillary purposes. See infra Part II.B.3.a. Testimony by the Deputy 
Legal Adviser to the Department of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
confirmed this characterization: “The Department of Justice . . . has suggested that 
implementing legislation . . . is desirable . . . to insure the coverage of the act extends to all 
cases arising under the treaty and . . . to take care of related venue and jurisdictional 
requirement problems.” 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5–6.
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obligations enforceable in domestic courts.”140 As that submission makes 
clear, the provisions of Article II are a complete set of substantive rules, 
expressly directed to national courts, regarding the enforcement of 
international arbitration agreements by those courts.141 From a textual 
perspective, Article II’s provisions are very close to textbook examples of 
treaty obligations that are meant to have direct effect.
2. Purposes of Article II
The conclusion that Article II is self-executing is supported by the 
object and purposes of both that provision and the Convention more 
generally. These purposes are relevant to interpretation of the treaty142 and, 
consequently, to the understanding and intentions of the United States in 
ratifying the Convention.143
As with other international treaties addressing issues of private 
international law, the drafters of Article II sought to establish a single 
uniform set of international legal standards, in this case for enforcing 
arbitration agreements in the courts of Contracting States.144 A delegate to 
the New York Conference made this point, noting that Contracting States 
should not be permitted to decline enforcement of arbitration agreements 
based on parochial local laws and that Article II’s provisions were thus 
essential to the “whole purpose of the Convention.”145 Likewise, a leading 
commentator on the Convention observed that, “[f]or the enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement, the Convention contains internationally uniform 
provisions.”146
National courts consistently recognize the Convention’s purpose of 
establishing internationally uniform rules for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. In the words of one court:
[T]he Convention and its implementing federal legislation express a 
clear federal interest in uniform rules by which agreements to 
arbitrate will be enforced . . . . The application of parochial 
rules . . . to agreements arising under the Convention would 
140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 9 (Aug. 26, 2010), Louisiana 
Safety Ass’n of Timbermen—Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 562 U.S. 
827 (2010) (cert. denied) [hereinafter Louisiana Safety Amicus Brief].
141. Id. at 8–9.
142. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006); Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, art. 31, ¶ 1, May 31, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 306(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
143. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 306 reporters’ note 11, § 310 reporters’ note 8.
144. See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c], at 106.
145. HAIGHT, SUMMARY ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 24–25; accord Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
146. VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION, supra note 3, at 123.
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frustrate one of the primary objectives of the United States in 
becoming a signatory to the Convention: securing uniform 
standards by which agreements to arbitrate international disputes 
are governed.147
The Supreme Court made the same point, observing that the Convention’s 
purpose was to “unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are 
observed and arbitral awards are enforced . . . .”148 Similarly, as the 
Canadian Supreme Court declared, “[t]he purpose of the Convention is to 
facilitate the cross-border recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by 
establishing a single, uniform set of rules that apply world-wide.”149 To the 
same effect, the United Nations General Assembly emphasized the 
importance of “uniform interpretation and effective implementation” of the 
Convention by Contracting States.150
Relatedly, like other private international law treaties applicable in 
multiple national jurisdictions, another objective of the Convention is 
harmonization—the development over time of common, uniform standards 
for the enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards in 
the courts of all Contracting States. The Convention’s terms inevitably leave 
room for interpretation. Given the Convention’s objective of uniformity in 
multiple jurisdictions, it is important that the courts of Contracting States 
interpret these terms in a harmonized manner. As a leading commentator on 
the Convention reasons, “[t]he significance of the New York Convention for 
147. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Argonaut Ins., 500 F.3d 571, 579–80
(7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis on ‘primary’ in original, all other emphasis added). 
148. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
149. Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., [2010] S.C.R. 649, 657 (Can.) (emphasis 
added); see also Smith/Enron Cogeneration L.P. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 
88, 96 (2d Cir. 1999) (Convention’s “goal of simplifying and unifying international arbitration 
law”); I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); URS Corp. v. 
Lebanese Co. for the Dev. & Reconstr. of Beirut Cent. Dist. SAL, 512 F.Supp.2d 199, 208 (D. 
Del. 2007) (“The primary purpose of the New York Convention . . . is to efficiently 
‘encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are 
observed.’”) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)); Gas 
Auth. of India Ltd. v. Spie Capag, S.A. And Others, AIR 1994 (Del.) 75, ¶ 86 (India) 
(Convention “lays down one uniform code” for the recognition of international arbitration 
agreements, and “provides a common yard stick . . . [that] generat[es] confidence in the 
parties, who may be unfamiliar with the diverse laws prevailing in different countries with 
which they are trading . . . .”).
150. G.A. Res. 62/65, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/65 (Dec. 6, 2007) (“Emphasizing the 
necessity for further national efforts and enhanced international cooperation to achieve 
universal adherence to the Convention and its uniform interpretation and effective 
implementation, with a view to fully realizing the objectives of the Convention . . . Requests
the Secretary-General to increase efforts to promote wider adherence to the Convention and 
its uniform interpretation and effective implementation.”) (emphasis in original).
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international commercial arbitration makes it even more important that the 
Convention is interpreted uniformly by the courts.”151
These purposes, and the intentions of the Convention’s Contracting 
States, are clearly best achieved by treating Article II as self-executing. 
Doing so means that courts in the United States—and other Contracting 
States that treat treaties as self-executing—will directly apply and interpret a 
single international text, informed by decisions in other Contracting States, 
rather than a multiplicity of individual national or sub-national legislative 
instruments. This significantly enhances the likelihood that international 
arbitration agreements will be subject to uniform international standards in 
all Contracting States. In contrast, treating Article II as non-self-executing 
would materially increase the risk that different Contracting States would 
adopt different implementing legislation for the Convention or divergent 
lines of judicial interpretation. This result would reduce the likelihood that 
uniform international rules will be applied under the Convention—contrary 
to the Convention’s basic purpose.
These intentions of the Convention’s Contracting States, reflected in the 
Convention’s object and purposes, bear directly on the meaning of the 
Convention and the United States’ obligations under the Convention. Just as 
the text of a treaty is relevant to its status as self-executing or not, because it 
informs the intentions of the U.S. political branches,152 other means of 
interpretation of a treaty, including the treaty’s object and purposes, must 
also be relevant to the understanding of the U.S. treaty-makers and the 
treaty’s status. That conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
applications of the self-executing treaty doctrine, which include 
consideration of the intentions of U.S. treaty counterparts.153
151. VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION, supra note 3, at 1, 6, 54–55, 168–69, 262–63, 274, 
357–58; see also Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (“need 
for uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”); Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, 500 F.3d, at 580 (“[U]niformity in determining the manner by which agreements to 
arbitrate will be enforced is a critical objective of the Convention . . . .”); IMC Aviation 
Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC [2011] 282 ALR 717, ¶ 35 (Austl.); IPCO (Nigeria) 
Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1157 [19] (Eng.) (“importance of 
uniformity in the interpretation of international conventions”); Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. 
Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 11, ¶ 28 (“When a number of states enter into a 
treaty to enforce each other’s arbitral awards, it stands to reason that they would do so in the 
realization that they, or some of them, will very likely have very different outlooks in regard 
to internal matters. And they would hardly intend, when entering into the treaty or later when 
incorporating it into their domestic law, that these differences should be allowed to operate so 
as to undermine the broad uniformity which must be the obvious aim of such a treaty and the 
domestic laws incorporating it.”).
152. See supra Part II.A; Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 497, 506–07 (2008). 
153. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 850–51 (2014) (citing international 
commentary for the conclusion that, “[a]lthough the [Chemical Weapons] Convention is a 
binding international agreement, it is ‘not self-executing.’”); United States v. Percheman, 32 
U.S. 51, 88 (1833) (holding treaty self-executing after considering Spanish text, after 
previously concluding that English text required treating treaty as non-self-executing: “If the 
English and the Spanish parts can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which 
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Finally, the nature of the Convention and the rights it confers confirm 
the self-executing character of Article II.154 As noted above, treaties 
addressing commercial matters, such as friendship, navigation, and 
commerce treaties and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, are particularly likely to be categorized as self-
executing.155 That is especially true where the treaty addresses private rights 
and obligations.156 Here, the Convention is a commercial treaty (focusing on 
international commercial arbitration), with Article II conferring private 
rights that arise only in national courts.157 These provisions are prime 
examples of the types of treaty provisions that have been, and should be, 
regarded as self-executing in the United States.
3. U.S. Ratification of the New York Convention
In ratifying the Convention, the United States also adopted 
implementing legislation, which added Chapter 2 to the original, domestic 
FAA. There is nothing in the language of Chapter 2, or in the history of the 
United States’ ratification of the Convention or enactment of Chapter 2, that 
contradicts the conclusion that the Convention is self-executing. On the 
contrary, the text and structure of the FAA, and the U.S. ratification process 
more generally, provide additional support for Article II’s self-executing 
status, despite customary caveats regarding the value of legislative 
history.158
establishes this conformity ought to prevail.”); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (citing foreign and international authority in concluding that treaty was non-self-
executing); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
310(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Courts will evaluate whether the text and context of the 
provision, along with other treaty materials, are consistent with an understanding by the U.S. 
treatymakers that the provision would be directly enforceable in courts in the United States.”).
154. See supra Part II.A. and note 107; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 
10.
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 111 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
156. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 
580, 598–99 (1884); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“act[s] directly” on
property rights); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 10 (“Courts also have been
more likely to find self-execution when treaty provisions address matters of individual or 
private rights as opposed to the rights of the state.”); see also VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. 
Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2014) (contractual rights of private party under 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods).
157. See generally BORN, supra note 1, ch. 8. The Convention permits a “commercial”
reservation that many Contracting States, including the United States, have made use of. Id.
158. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) 
(“[L]egislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . . [J]udicial 
reliance on legislative materials like committee reports . . . may give unrepresentative 
committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the 
incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legal history to secure results they were unable 
to achieve through the statutory text.”).
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a. Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
Some authorities have concluded, with little analysis, that the enactment 
of Chapter 2 of the FAA implementing the Convention suggests that the 
Convention is non-self-executing.159 As discussed below, the language and 
structure of Chapter 2 of the FAA do not suggest that the Convention is 
non-self-executing. Instead, both the text and the legislative history of 
Chapter 2 confirm that the Convention, and particularly Article II, is self-
executing.
Chapter 2 of the FAA was adopted notwithstanding the existence of the 
original FAA enacted in 1925. These relatively brief provisions, which were 
re-titled “Chapter 1” in 1970, address the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards involving “commerce among the several States or 
with foreign nations . . . .”160 Most importantly, Section 2 of the Act 
provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract[,]” while Sections 3 and 4 provide for stays of 
litigation and orders compelling arbitration where parties have validly 
agreed to arbitrate.161 In turn, Sections 9 and 10 of the Act provide for the 
recognition of arbitral awards, subject to specified exceptions.162 Other 
provisions of what became Chapter 1 of the FAA address miscellaneous 
issues, including the ability to appeal, injunctive authority, and the act of 
state doctrine.163
Chapter 2 added eight brief sections to the FAA in order to implement 
the Convention. Section 201 is an introductory section, which provides that 
“[t]he Convention . . . shall be enforced in United States courts in 
accordance with this chapter.”164 Sections 202 and 203 define, in relatively 
broad terms, the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction over actions 
arising under the Convention and grant U.S. district courts jurisdiction over 
those actions.165 Section 204 deals with venue in federal district courts, and 
159. See, e.g., Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 112 (“[I]t may seem odd to 
consider whether the New York Convention is self-executing when Congress has in fact 
enacted legislation implementing it.”).
160. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
161. Id. §§ 2–4. Sections 5 and 7 deal with the appointment of arbitrators and taking of 
evidence in aid of arbitration. Id. §§ 5, 7.
162. Id. §§ 9–10.
163. Id. §§ 6, 8, 12, 15, 16.
164. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
165. Id. § 202 (“An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a 
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the 
Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely 
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless 
that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement 
abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”); id. § 203. 
146 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:115
Section 205 addresses removal of actions to federal district courts.166 Section 
206 authorizes federal courts to order arbitration in foreign arbitral seats 
(remedying a limitation on the injunctive powers of federal district courts 
under Chapter 1 of the FAA).167 Finally, Section 207 provides for the 
recognition of foreign awards by federal courts, subject to a three-year 
statute of limitations, “unless [the court] finds one of the grounds for refusal 
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said
Convention[,]”168 and Section 208 is a residual savings clause for Chapter 
1’s provisions.169 As noted above, nothing in Chapter 2 incorporates the 
terms of Article II, much less provides more detailed or comprehensive 
substantive provisions than those in Article II.170
Preliminarily, the fact that Chapter 2 provides implementing measures 
for the Convention in federal courts does not suggest that the Convention is 
non-self-executing. In the words of the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States:
[T[he adoption of related legislation is an unreliable indication of 
the understanding of U.S. treatymakers with regard to self-
execution. Congress may adopt legislation necessary and proper to 
implement any valid treaty commitment. The adoption of U.S. 
legislation implementing some aspects of a treaty, or establishing 
related procedures, however, does not necessarily suggest that 
other, substantive aspects of the treaty are not self-executing.171
It is particularly unsurprising that a treaty like the Convention, which 
imposes significant obligations directly affecting the rights of private parties 
in U.S. courts, in a field subject to existing federal legislation, would be 
accompanied by legislation containing ancillary provisions addressing 
issues such as venue, subject matter jurisdiction, removal, and injunctive 
This jurisdictional grant expands upon the scope of § 2 of Chapter 1 of the FAA (which 
applies to foreign and interstate commerce).
166. Id. §§ 204–205.
167. Id. § 206. Many lower courts had interpreted § 4 of the FAA as limiting orders 
compelling arbitration to arbitrations seated in the district of the federal court ordering 
arbitration. See BORN, supra note 1, § 14.08[B][1], at 2107–11. Section 206 remedies this gap 
in the FAA’s treatment of international arbitration agreements. Id. § 14.08[B][2], at 2111.
168. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). 
169. Section 208 provides that Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to actions under Chapter 2 
(which implements the Convention), but only to the extent that Chapter 1 “is not in conflict 
with this chapter [2] or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” Id. § 208.
170. See supra Part II.B.1.
171. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (citation omitted). See, e.g., id. (citing S. EXEC.
REP. NO. 110–12, at 7 (2008)) (“noting in relation to 28 extradition treaties that the ‘legal 
procedures for extradition are governed by both federal statute and self-executing treaties” and 
that “[s]ubject to a contrary treaty provision, existing federal law implements aspects of these 
treaties’”).
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authority.172 These types of provisions address the procedural issues that 
inevitably arise and must be resolved in order to allow effective 
enforcement of the Convention’s substantive terms. As an international 
instrument with 159 Contracting States, the Convention does not, and could 
not sensibly, address the types of jurisdictional, venue, and procedural 
issues that local law regulates.173
The enactment of Chapter 2 therefore does not suggest that Congress 
regarded the Convention’s provisions as non-self-executing, but only that 
Congress wanted to ensure the effective and efficient enforcement of the 
Convention’s self-executing substantive terms in U.S. courts.174 This is 
precisely how the legislative history describes Chapter 2, explaining that it 
addresses issues of “civil procedure” and “establish[es] adequate 
procedures” for federal courts to apply to the Convention.175 Indeed, as also 
discussed below, Sections 201 and 208 provide that the terms of the 
172. See David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption, 2015 
BYU L. REV. 1555, 1557 n.10 (2016) (“Although a self-executing treaty might be the subject 
of facilitating legislation—legislation that, for example, ‘detail[s] specific legal procedures, 
burdens of proof, and remedies for courts applying’ the treaty—the treaty itself would remain 
directly enforceable in U.S. courts and should be treated, for preemption purposes, like self-
executing treaties that lack facilitating legislation.”) (alteration in original) (citing John F. 
Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 666–67, 
nn.4–45 (2010)).
173. Indeed, this is expressed in Article III. See New York Convention, art. III (“Each 
Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance 
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon . . . .”).
174. Notably, Chapter 2 does not contain provisions giving effect to Article II’s
substantive terms.
175. See, e.g., 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5–6, 8 (“The Department of 
Justice . . . has suggested that implementing legislation amending certain sections of titles 9 
and 28 of the United States Code is desirable. These amendments would be additions to the 
Federal Arbitration Act to insure the coverage of the act extends to all cases arising under the 
treaty and some changes in Federal civil procedure to take care of related venue and 
jurisdictional requirement problems. We will not submit the U.S. ratification of the 
convention until this legislation establishing adequate procedures has been approved by the 
Congress.”); see also infra pp. 42–43, 52–53.
Unsurprisingly, as the legislative history makes clear, the United States did not ratify the 
Convention until Chapter 2’s procedures were in place. That does not suggest that the 
Convention is non-self-executing, instead only indicating that the self-executing terms of the 
Convention required procedural and ancillary mechanisms to be effectively applied in U.S. 
federal courts. See e.g., Hearing to Implement the Convention in the Recognition of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong. 32 (1970) 
(statement of Richard D. Kearney) as reprinted in S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 5 (1970) (“The bill 
which is presently before you sets up the legal structure that is required to implement the 
Convention.”) [hereinafter 1970 Kearney Statement]; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, S. EXEC. DOC. E 90-2, at 1 (1968) (“The 
United States instrument of accession to the Convention will be executed only after the 
necessary legislation is enacted.”); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-10, at 2 (1968) (“Changes in the 
[FAA] . . . will be required before the United States becomes party to the Convention.”).
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Convention itself—not the substantive terms of a U.S. statute—will be 
enforced in U.S. courts. This conclusion is impossible to reconcile with 
treatment of the Convention as a non-self-executing treaty.176
There are a number of additional aspects of the text and structure of 
Chapter 2 of the FAA that confirm that the Convention was understood by 
the federal political branches in 1970 to be self-executing. First, as detailed 
below, it is clear that Chapter 2 addresses only the application of the 
Convention by U.S. federal (and not state) courts. As a consequence, unless 
the Convention is self-executing, its substantive terms would not be 
applicable at all in state courts. This is an untenable result that, as discussed 
below, would likely have placed the United States in violation of its 
obligations to enforce international arbitration agreements and awards under 
the Convention in 1970 and which neither the President nor Congress would 
reasonably have intended.177
Chapter 2 defines the courts in which its provisions are applicable. 
Section 201 provides that the Convention “shall be enforced in United 
States courts” in accordance with Chapter 2’s provisions.178 Other 
provisions of Chapter 2 either repeat and clarify the same reference to 
“United States courts”179 or refer to Chapter 2’s federal subject matter 
jurisdiction provisions.180 It is evident from the text of these provisions that 
the term “United States courts,” as used in Chapter 2, means U.S. federal,
not state, courts.
The phrase “United States courts” refers most naturally to a court “of” 
or “established by” the United States—namely, a U.S. federal court, 
established pursuant to the U.S. Constitution—not a state court established
pursuant to the laws of one of the several states. The term “United States 
court” plainly means federal (and not state) courts in other statutory 
176. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. Consistent with this, courts have 
directly applied provisions of the Convention, even after noting that Chapter 2 of the FAA 
provides implementing legislation. See, e.g., Jain v. de Méré, 51 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 
1995); CRT Capital Grp. v. SLS Capital, S.A., 63 F. Supp. 3d 367, 372–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 
Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 980 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25, 25 n.3 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Composite Concepts Co. v. Berkenhoff GmbH, No. CA2009-11-149, 
2010 WL 2371991, at *3, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2010); Martinez v. Colombian 
Emeralds, Inc., Nos. 2007-06, 2007-11, 2009 WL 578547, at *12–13 (V.I. Mar. 4, 2009).
177. See infra pp. 36–37.
178. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (emphasis added).
179. Id. § 203 (providing that “[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have 
original jurisdiction” over an action or proceeding falling under the Convention.) (emphasis 
added).
180. Id. § 206 (providing that “[a] court having jurisdiction under this chapter” may 
compel arbitration or appoint arbitrators in accordance with an arbitration agreement); id. §
207 (providing that a party may apply to “any court having jurisdiction under this chapter”
for an order confirming an award) (emphasis added). See supra note 165 and accompanying 
text (discussing 9 U.S.C. §§ 202–03).
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settings,181 including, for example, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
which grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of “courts of the 
United States and of the States . . . .”182 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
distinguishes “United States courts” and “courts of the United States” as 
compared to state courts in a variety of statutory settings.183 Even more 
directly, Chapter 1 itself uses the term “courts of the United States” or 
“United States courts” to refer to what are clearly federal, and not state, 
courts.184 The Supreme Court concluded, in fairly clear terms, that Chapter 
1’s language has this meaning.185 It is unlikely that Congress intended the 
181. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2012) (providing that “a case so removed shall have a 
place on the calendar of the United States court to which it is removed relative to that which it 
held on the State court from which it was removed.”); 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2012) (defining the 
term “court of the United States” as “the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of 
appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of 
International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled 
to hold office during good behavior.”); 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2012) (distinguishing between “any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State” in circumstances involving 
limitations on injunctive relief in labor disputes); FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 cmt. 2 (providing that 
“[t]he courts of the United States” include “[f]ederal courts in the continental United States”
as well as federal “district courts in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.”).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012). 
183. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 245–47
(1970) (providing that “court of the United States” in 29 U.S.C. § 104 applies only to federal 
courts, not state courts); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181–82 (1954) (distinguishing 
between “United States courts” (which are federal courts) and “courts” (which include state 
courts)); see also Woodson v. McCollum, 875 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 2017) (“A state 
court is not a ‘court of the United States’ as defined for Title 28 of the United States Code.”); 
Steckelberg v. Rice, 184 F. Supp. 3d 746, 758 (D. Neb. 2016) (“[A] ‘court of the United 
States’ is a federal court, not a state court . . . .”); Bloodworth v. United States, 623 F. App’x
976, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The phrase ‘court of the United States’ refers to Article III courts 
and the courts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 451.”); McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 
F.3d 1031, 1035 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (“As defined in Title 28 U.S.C. § 451, the phrase ‘court 
of the United States’ in § 1985(2) refers only to Article III courts and certain federal courts 
created by act of Congress, but not to state courts.”) (Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 
1370 (E.D. La. 1975) (“As defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451, ‘court of the United States’ refers only 
to the Article III courts and certain federal courts created by Act of Congress. It does not 
include the various state courts.”), aff’d, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
184. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (“courts of the United States”); id. § 4 (“United States district 
court”); id. § 7 (“United States courts”; “courts of the United States”); id. §§ 9–11 (“United 
States court in and for the district”). Similarly, the reference in § 203 to “district courts of the 
United States” suggests that the reference to “United States courts” in § 201 is a reference to 
federal courts.
185. The Supreme Court has made clear that §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA, referring to “courts 
of the United States” includes only federal, and not state, courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984); id. at 29 n.18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“§ 3’s ‘courts of the 
United States’ is a term of art whose meaning is unmistakable. State courts are ‘in’ but not 
‘of’ the United States.”); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 
(1989); Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 109 (“section 3 by its terms applies to ‘courts 
of the United States – a term that means federal courts.”).
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reference in Chapter 2 to “United States courts” to mean something 
different from “courts of the United States” and “United States courts” in 
Chapter 1 of the same statute.186
The content and structure of Chapter 2 confirm this conclusion. As 
noted above, Section 201 provides that “[t]he Convention . . . shall be 
enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”187
Importantly, the remainder of “this chapter” only concerns U.S. federal
courts. Sections 202 to 208 of Chapter 2 all apply only in U.S. federal
courts, defining federal subject matter jurisdiction, venue, injunctive power, 
removal, and other provisions, with no mention of the Convention’s 
application in state courts.188 Thus, when Section 201 refers to the 
Convention being enforced in “United States courts in accordance with this 
chapter,” it must refer to federal courts because the remainder of “this 
chapter” deals only with the application of the Convention in federal courts 
and says nothing about enforcement of the Convention in state courts.
The legislative history of Chapter 2 confirms that the chapter’s 
provisions apply only in federal courts. According to Richard Kearney, the 
Chairman of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private 
International Law, Chapter 2 provided a “system of implementation through 
the United States District Courts.”189 Indeed, Ambassador Kearney testified 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the statutory provisions of 
Chapter 2 would not “have any effect whatever on state laws” and that the 
legislation concerns “solely the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts.”190
These explanations confirm the relatively unambiguous text of Chapter 2, 
which limits the provisions of that chapter to U.S. federal courts.191 Notably, 
186. Where the same term is used within a statute or among related statutes, it is 
presumed to have the same meaning. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) 
(“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each 
time it appears.”); Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994).
187. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
188. See supra pp. 36–37. The only arguable exception is § 205, dealing with removal of 
actions arising under the Convention from state courts. That provision does not deal with 
enforcement but instead removal of actions arising under the Convention from state courts, so 
the Convention can then be enforced in federal courts. Nothing in Chapter 2 addresses how 
the Convention is to be enforced in state courts if actions are not removed from those courts. 
Instead, and naturally, procedural and jurisdictional issues relating to enforcement of the 
Convention in state courts are left to state law.
189. 1970 Kearney Statement, supra note 175, at 8 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (“The Chairman: . . . Does this legislation have any 
effect whatever on State laws? Mr. Kearney: No, Mr. Chairman, it does not. It concerns in 
effect solely the jurisdiction of Federal district courts.”). Notably, this colloquy did not refer 
to the Convention itself, as distinguished from Chapter 2 of the FAA. As discussed below, the 
Convention obviously was regarded as having effects on state law, but this was not the subject 
of Ambassador Kearney’s testimony; see also Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 111.
191. The Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investment 
Arbitration apparently takes the position that some, but not all, of Chapter 2 of the FAA 
applies in state courts. Although the text is unclear, the Restatement appears to treat § 201 as 
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these comments were confined to only the jurisdictional and procedural 
provisions in the statutory text of Chapter 2 and did not address the 
substantive terms of the Convention itself, which were, as discussed below, 
regarded as self-executing and applicable in both state and federal courts.192
In short, nothing in Chapter 2 makes the Convention’s terms applicable 
in state courts. As a consequence, if the Convention were non-self-
executing, nothing in Chapter 2 or otherwise would implement the
Convention in state courts, leaving the Convention’s substantive terms 
wholly inapplicable in state courts. It is extremely unlikely that this was the 
intention of Congress or the President in ratifying the Convention and 
enacting Chapter 2 in 1970—a result that, as discussed further below, would 
have placed the United States in almost immediate breach of the Convention 
by leaving its terms inapplicable in a substantial majority of American 
courts.193
As discussed above, Article II(3) of the Convention imposes mandatory 
requirements for the recognition of arbitration agreements in the courts of 
Contracting States: “[t]he court of a Contracting State . . . shall . . . refer the 
parties to arbitration.”194 Relatedly, Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the 
Convention also impose mandatory requirements for the recognition of 
arbitral awards in Contracting States’ courts.195 Inevitably, U.S. state courts 
address numerous disputes over the recognition of international arbitration 
agreements and awards.196 In 1970, however, arbitration legislation in nearly 
one-third of all U.S. states clearly did not provide for the effective 
recognition of arbitration agreements197 or arbitral awards.198
applicable only in federal courts (with the result, according to the Restatement, that only § 2 
of Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to the recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitration agreements in state courts). See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L 
COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2 cmt. b, note a(iii), b(i). As discussed in text, the 
conclusion that § 201 applies only in federal courts is fairly clearly correct, given the 
unambiguous text and legislative history of the provision. Elsewhere, however, the 
Restatement appears to conclude that § 207 of Chapter 2 of the FAA applies in state courts 
(and provides for recognition of awards in state courts in accordance with the Convention). Id.
§ 1-5 cmt. b. The Restatement’s approach is contradicted by the text of § 207, which applies 
only in “courts having jurisdiction under this chapter,” which is unquestionably a reference to 
federal courts, exercising the federal subject-matter jurisdiction conferred by § 202 and § 203. 
The Restatement’s approach to § 207 is also contradicted by Chapter 2’s legislative history 
(discussed elsewhere), which repeatedly states that Chapter 2 of the FAA was not intended to 
have any effect on state courts or state law. As discussed below, the Restatement’s approach is 
untenable. See infra p. 81.
192. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
193. See infra p. 44.
194. See supra Part I.B.1. 
195. See supra Part I.B.2 and infra Part II.C.1.
196. See cases cited infra. notes 233–35.
197. As discussed below, infra note 264 and accompanying text, statutes and judicial 
decisions in a number of states when Chapter 2 of the FAA was enacted in 1970 continued to 
deny effect to arbitration agreements or awards. See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65,
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Moreover, as of 1970, the Supreme Court had not held that Section 2 of 
the FAA applied in state courts, and the Court would not do so for another 
15 years.199 As a consequence, if the Convention were not self-executing, 
then, because Chapter 2 of the FAA applies only in federal courts, a 
substantial number of state courts would have applied state law (as it existed 
in 1970) to international arbitration agreements, which would have not 
infrequently denied effect to such agreements. Likewise, the Supreme Court 
had not yet held in 1970 (and still has not held) that Sections 9 and 10 of the 
FAA apply in state courts.200 As a consequence, if the Convention were non-
self-executing, state courts considering requests for recognition of either 
arbitration agreements or awards in 1970 would very likely have applied 
existing state law and, equally clearly, would have also denied recognition 
frequently.
Given the limited scope of Chapter 2, the result of treating the 
Convention as non-self-executing would likely have been to place the 
United States in violation of its obligations under the Convention following 
ratification in 1970. As noted above, nearly one-third of all state arbitration 
statutes in 1970 would not have permitted recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitration agreements or awards in accordance with the 
mandatory requirements of the Convention,201 a result that would have 
constituted material non-compliance with the Convention. As discussed 
below, the federal political branches carefully examined the substantive 
terms of existing state arbitration legislation prior to ratifying the 
Convention.202 It is difficult to imagine that, given this knowledge, Congress 
and the President would have intended, in ratifying the Convention and 
enacting Chapter 2, to put the United States into almost immediate breach of 
the Convention’s terms. The most plausible conclusion, rather, is that the 
political branches understood that the Convention was self-executing and 
therefore applicable in state courts, thereby ensuring U.S. compliance with 
the Convention.
Second, although U.S. arbitration law has evolved materially since 
1970, Chapter 2’s structure would continue even today to produce untenable 
results in state and potentially in federal courts if the Convention were non-
self-executing. In particular, as discussed below and as illustrated in 
at 7 (testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, based on a review of state 
statutes and judicial decisions in 1970, it was possible to enforce an arbitration agreement for 
future disputes in only 36 states).
198. See infra pp. 75–76.
199. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1984).
200. See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[B][1][e][iv], at 161–65; RESTATEMENT OF U.S.
LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2 reporters’ note a(ii) (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018). As also discussed below, U.S. state courts are divided on the 
question whether §§ 9 and 10 of the FAA apply (and have preemptive effects) in state courts, 
with several state courts rejecting this conclusion. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 197.
202. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
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Appendix A, significant uncertainties and complexities would arise from 
treating the Convention as non-self-executing.
If the Convention were non-self-executing, it is unclear what 
substantive rules of law would apply today in either federal or state courts to 
international arbitration agreements and awards. In federal courts, possible 
alternatives for implementation of the Convention would include (a) the 
Convention, incorporated by Section 201 of the FAA, for both arbitration 
agreements and awards; (b) Chapter 1 of the FAA, incorporated by Section 
208, for arbitration agreements, and the Convention, incorporated by 
Section 207, for awards; (c) Chapter 1 of the FAA for both arbitration 
agreements and awards, incorporated by Section 208. In state courts, most 
of these possibilities also arise, as well as the application of state law to 
arbitration agreements and/or awards in a significant category of cases.
Neither the text of Chapter 2—which is terse and, on these issues, 
equivocal—nor its legislative history allows easy determination of which of 
these various alternatives is correct.203 That produces uncertainty as to the 
effect of the Convention in American courts and, regardless of which of 
these interpretations is accepted, an unsatisfying checkerboard of results for 
enforcement of the Convention. These uncertainties and complexities argue 
against treating the Convention as non-self-executing because it is unlikely 
that the federal political branches would have intended such an uncertain 
and confused implementation of U.S. treaty obligations. In contrast, none of 
these difficulties arise if the Convention is self-executing.
Third, under any of the legal regimes that would arise from treating the 
Convention as non-self-executing, there would be a number of very 
substantial differences between the standards applicable to recognition of 
international arbitration agreements and awards under the Convention itself, 
on the one hand, and those applicable under domestic law, on the other 
hand. These differences would exist regardless of whether existing state 
arbitration laws or Chapter 1 of the FAA were applied. These differences 
between the substantive provisions of the Convention and domestic U.S. 
law, which are detailed below,204 would, again, very likely leave the United 
States in material breach of the Convention in significant categories of 
cases.
203. Assuming that the Convention is non-self-executing, it is unclear whether § 201 of 
the FAA could be read as incorporating the Convention into the FAA (in federal courts). 
Section 201 provides that the Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts in 
accordance with this chapter[,]” which arguably incorporates the Convention’s substantive 
terms into Chapter 2. On the other hand, § 207 contains a separate provision arguably 
incorporating only Article V of the Convention (which would appear to be redundant if § 201 
incorporated the entire Convention). Moreover, § 201 appears to be in the nature of an 
introductory provision, making it clear that the remainder of Chapter 2 provides jurisdictional 
and procedural provisions for application of the self-executing terms of the Convention. 
Section 208 is equally terse, and equally unclear, providing a residual savings provision for 
Chapter 1’s terms.
204. See infra p. 47.
154 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:115
Initially, there are a number of very substantial differences between 
contemporary state arbitration laws and the Convention’s terms. These 
differences vary from state to state but continue to include state laws that 
permit revocation of agreements to arbitrate future disputes, exclude 
particular disputes from arbitration, impose non-arbitrability rules, apply 
idiosyncratic contract law rules, and permit review of the merits of arbitral 
awards.205 Application of these various state laws to international arbitration 
agreements and awards would entail violation of the Convention’s 
requirements that Contracting States recognize and enforce arbitration 
agreements and awards, subject to only limited exceptions. Although it is 
likely that Section 2 of the FAA now preempts state law applicable to many 
international arbitration agreements, including in state courts, this 
conclusion is not free from doubt.206 Insofar as state arbitration law applies 
to international arbitration agreements subject to the Convention, it is clear 
that these standards will frequently differ materially from those under the 
Convention.
Moreover, even if one assumed that Section 2 of the domestic FAA 
preempted the application of state arbitration laws, there is a lengthy 
catalogue of material differences between the treatment of international 
arbitration agreements under Article II of the Convention and the treatment 
of such agreements under Section 2 of Chapter 1 of the FAA. Among other
things, U.S. courts have consistently held that the Convention and Chapter 1 
of the FAA differ materially with respect to: (a) the choice-of-law rules 
governing the existence and validity of arbitration agreements (with Articles 
II(3) and V(1)(a) prescribing international standards and Chapter 1 
providing for U.S. state choice-of-law rules);207 (b) the available substantive 
grounds for challenging the validity of international arbitration agreements 
205. See Sebastien Besson, The Utility of State Laws Regulating International 
Commercial Arbitration and Their Compatibility with the FAA, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 211, 
226, 233 (2000); Daniel A. Zeft, The Applicability of State International Arbitration Statutes 
and the Absence of Significant Preemption Concerns, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 705, 
790 n.269 (1997).
206. Section 2 of the FAA presumably preempts state law applicable to international 
arbitration agreements and awards which are subject to Chapter 1 of the FAA. See Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (stating that in domestic contexts, § 2 of the FAA 
applies as preemptive federal law in state courts). Arguably, however, if Congress enacted 
Chapter 2 of the FAA with the intention of excluding state courts and state law from the 
Convention’s coverage, to preserve state prerogatives in that field, then Chapter 1 of the FAA 
should not be interpreted to apply to international arbitration agreements and awards which 
are subject to the Convention. Despite Chapter 1’s application to arbitration agreements and 
awards relating to “interstate” and “foreign” commerce generally, the more specific provisions 
of Chapter 2 should arguably govern arbitration agreements and awards subject to the 
Convention.
207. See BORN, supra note 1, § 4.04[A][2][j][iv], at 535–36; RESTATEMENT OF U.S.
LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2 reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (noting “differences in the applicable law” under Article II 
and § 2 of FAA); supra pp. 8–9. I.B.1.
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(with Article II(3) prescribing limited international grounds and Chapter 1 
prescribing broader domestic grounds);208 (c) the scope of the non-
arbitrability exception to the enforceability of arbitration agreements (which 
is narrower under Article II than Chapter 1);209 (d) the form requirements for 
international arbitration agreements (with Article II(1) and (2) providing 
different written form requirements than Chapter 1);210 (e) the courts’ 
obligation to “refer the parties to arbitration” under Article II(3) of the 
Convention and the absence of such a requirement under Section 2 of the 
FAA (in contrast to Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA);211 (f) the courts’ power to 
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a non-U.S. arbitral seat (which is 
required under the Convention and unavailable under Chapter 1);212 (g) the 
United States’ reciprocity reservation, establishing an exception to the 
Convention’s obligations for arbitration agreements and awards made in 
non-Convention states (which is not included in Chapter 1);213 and (h) the 
federal policies favoring enforcement of international arbitration agreements 
subject to the Convention (which have repeatedly been held to be more 
expansive than under Chapter 1).214
208. See supra Part I.B.1. Compare New York Convention, art. II, ¶ 3 (“null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed”), with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
209. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638–
39 (1985) (antitrust claims are arbitrable pursuant to Convention, even if they would not be 
under domestic FAA); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974) (securities 
law claims are arbitrable pursuant to Convention, even if they would not be under domestic 
FAA); Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2012) (New York 
Convention “ ‘expressly compels the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements,’
notwithstanding jurisdiction conferred on such courts to adjudicate Seaman’s Wage Act 
claims.”); Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2002); see also 
1 BORN, supra note 1, § 6.02[A], at 946–47, § 6.03[C][4], at 964–65. Compare New York 
Convention, arts. II, ¶ 1, V, ¶ 2(a)–(b), with 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
210. See BORN, supra note 1, § 5.02[A][5][c], at 700. Compare New York Convention, 
art. II, ¶¶ 1–2, with 9 U.S.C. § 2.
211. Compare New York Convention, art. II, ¶ 3 (“refer the parties to arbitration”), with
9 U.S.C. § 2. Chapter 1’s requirements regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements by 
stays or orders compelling arbitration are contained in §§ 3 and 4, not § 2. See also Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346–47 (2006) (“[W]here a treaty provides for a particular 
judicial remedy . . . . Courts must apply the remedy as a requirement of federal law”). 
212. See BORN, supra note 1, § 14.07[C], at 2097–98. Compare New York Convention, 
art. II, ¶ 3, with 9 U.S.C. § 4.
213. See BORN, supra note 1, § 2.03[G], at 342–43, § 22.02[F], at 2970–78. Compare
New York Convention, arts. I, ¶ 1, XIV, with 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The reciprocity reservation is 
of limited (but some) practical importance today, because 159 states have ratified the 
Convention; the situation was very different in 1970, when the United States was the 36th 
Contracting State to ratify the Convention.
214. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 631 (“[S]ince this Nation’s accession in 1970 to 
the Convention and the implementation of the Convention in the same year by amendment of 
the [FAA], that federal policy applies with special force in the field of international 
commerce.”) (internal citation and footnote omitted); Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 
638 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2011) (federal policy favoring arbitration “is even stronger in the 
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The Restatement of U.S. Law of International Commercial and 
Investment Arbitration suggests that Section 2 of the domestic FAA and
Article II of the Convention provide “essentially equivalent” standards for 
recognition of arbitration agreements.215 That suggestion is incorrect; as 
outlined above, there are material differences in the standards currently 
applicable to arbitration agreements under Section 2 and Article II.216 These 
(and other) differences reflect the unsurprising fact that the standards 
applicable to domestic arbitration agreements under a domestic U.S. statute, 
enacted by Congress in 1925,217 differ significantly from those applicable 
under an international treaty, negotiated without material U.S. involvement 
in 1958, binding on 159 Contracting States and prescribing standards for 
international arbitration agreements.218 It is almost inevitable, but in any 
event clear, that the standards under Article II of the Convention are 
materially different from those under Section 2 of the FAA. Harmonizing 
divergent national laws is a central objective of the Convention,219 and those 
divergences are what plainly appear from a comparison of the Convention 
and Chapter 1 of the FAA.
The existence of these material differences between the standards under 
Article II of the Convention and Section 2 of the FAA produces a highly 
unsatisfactory result, entailing non-trivial U.S. non-compliance with its 
obligations under the Convention.220 That is because Section 2 currently 
context of international business transactions where arbitral agreements promote the smooth 
flow of international transactions by removing the threats and uncertainty of time-consuming 
and expensive litigation.”) (alteration and quotations omitted); Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he national policy favoring arbitration 
has extra force when international arbitration is at issue.”); David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. 
Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991) (“This treaty—to which 
the United States is a signatory—makes it clear that the liberal federal arbitration policy 
applies with special force in the field of international commerce.”) (internal quotation 
omitted).
215. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2
reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018).
216. See supra pp. 47–48; see also Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 546–
48 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he broad defenses applicable in the context of domestic arbitration 
are not generally available in cases governed by the New York Convention.”); Variblend Dual 
Dispensing Sys., LLC v. Seidel GmbH & Co., KG, 970 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“The New York Convention supplies a limitation on the FAA’s ordinary standard that state-
law principles determine whether an arbitral contract has been formed.”).
217. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development 
of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 250–51 (1928).
218. See supra Part I.A.
219. See supra Parts I.A–B.
220. Treating the Convention as non-self-executing, and subjecting international 
arbitration agreements to Chapter 1 of the FAA, also leaves the future enforcement of 
international arbitration agreements subject to the domestic FAA’s local standards. Those 
standards are developed principally for a different (domestic) context and set of different 
(domestic) agreements, and they will almost certainly diverge at various points in the future 
from the Convention’s international standards. Again, one of the principal objects of any 
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provides, in many material respects, less favorable standards for recognition 
and enforcement of arbitration agreements than Article II of the Convention. 
Moreover, treating the Convention as non-self-executing also results in the 
application of different standards to international arbitration agreements in 
U.S. state and federal courts, with Article II of the Convention applying in 
federal courts, through either Section 201 or Section 208 of the FAA, and 
Section 2 of the FAA applying in state courts.221 This result would frustrate 
the objectives of uniformity, both generally in U.S. treaty application222 and 
specifically with regard to the Convention (as discussed above).223 It is again 
difficult to imagine that the federal political branches intended such results 
when they ratified the Convention and enacted Chapter 2 of the FAA.
Fourth, there is a further difficulty arising from treating the Convention 
as non-self-executing, which results from the jurisdictional reach of the 
domestic FAA. It is clear that the Convention applies more broadly (to all 
international arbitration agreements and to all “foreign” and “non-domestic” 
awards) than Chapter 1 of the FAA (which applies only to agreements and 
awards that involve the “foreign commerce” of the United States).224 Thus, 
Section 1 of the FAA (requiring U.S. commerce “with foreign nations”) 
would not apply to a substantial category of international arbitration 
agreements between non-U.S. parties (e.g., Chinese and German; South 
African and Brazilian) engaged in non-U.S. transactions or to an equally 
substantial category of awards made in non-U.S. arbitral seats (e.g., Paris; 
international treaty, and particularly the Convention, is to prevent such divergences. See supra 
Parts I.A–B.
221. As discussed below, the possibility of removal from state to federal court would not 
bring the United States into compliance with the Convention and would not have been 
regarded by the U.S. political branches as a tenable means of implementing the Convention. 
See infra pp. 60–61.
222. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 13 (2014) (emphasizing the “need for 
uniform international interpretation of the [Hague] Convention.”); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 
1, 16 (2010) (“ ‘[U]niform international interpretation’ of the [Hague] Convention is part of 
the Convention’s framework.”); Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 677 (2005) (discussing 
whether an ICJ interpretation of the Vienna Convention should be followed “for sake of 
uniform treaty interpretation . . . ?”); El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 
155, 157 (1999) (“[Warsaw] Convention’s central endeavor to foster uniformity . . . .”).
223. See supra Parts I.A–B.
224. Compare New York Convention, art. I, ¶ 1 (“arbitral awards made in the territory 
of a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought”), 
and id. art. II, ¶ 2 (international “arbitration agreement”), with 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) 
(“commerce among the several States or with foreign nations”). Section 1 of the FAA extends 
to the limits of Congress’ domestic authority over interstate commerce and, presumably, over 
foreign commerce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73 (1995). 
Importantly, however, on any view, foreign commerce with the United States requires some 
connection to the United States; see also Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the 
Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941); 
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 962 (2010). A
very significant proportion of all international contracts and arbitration agreements, between 
wholly non-U.S. parties and involving entirely foreign transactions, have no such connection.
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Singapore) in arbitrations between non-U.S. parties. It is fair to say, 
notwithstanding the breadth of Congress’s foreign commerce power, that 
substantially more international arbitration agreements and awards fall 
outside Congress’s legislative authority—but within the Convention’s 
scope225—than those which fall within Congress’s authority.
The jurisdictional limitation of Section 1 of the FAA restricts the reach 
of the substantive rules prescribed by Section 2 of the Act, in both federal 
and state courts.226 As a consequence, if the Convention were not self-
executing, and only Section 2 of the FAA implemented Article II of the 
Convention, then a significant number of international arbitration 
agreements that are within the Convention’s scope but do not involve U.S. 
“foreign commerce” would be subject to state, not federal, law in U.S. state 
courts.227 The same analysis applies to Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA as 
applied to arbitral awards.228 As already discussed, these results would 
almost certainly place the United States in serious breach of its obligations 
under the Convention with respect to these agreements and awards.
Again, it is unlikely that the U.S. political branches intended the 
unsatisfactory and uncertain results summarized above. Rather, the 
straightforward, sensible result that the federal political branches much 
more plausibly intended in ratifying the Convention and enacting Chapter 2 
was that the Convention would be self-executing and therefore applicable in 
both state and federal courts alike; in turn, Chapter 2 provided the 
procedural rules necessary to facilitate the Convention’s application in 
federal courts, while analogous jurisdictional, venue, and other procedural 
issues in state courts would be addressed by state law. Indeed, this is 
precisely how the FAA’s legislative history describes Chapter 2: “These 
amendments would be additions to the Federal Arbitration Act to insure the 
coverage of the act extends to all cases arising under the treaty and some 
changes in Federal civil procedure to take care of related venue and 
jurisdictional requirement problems.”229
Under this analysis, Section 201 rests on the premise, and expressly 
provides, that it is the Convention itself, as a self-executing treaty, that is 
applicable in state and federal courts, with Chapter 2 of the FAA supplying 
225. It is clear that the treaty power gives the United States the authority to conclude 
treaties governing international matters that are not within U.S. foreign commerce. See
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 302 cmt. d, 303 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
226. Section 2 of the domestic FAA applies to “[a] written provision in any maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce[,]” defined in § 1 as 
commerce of the United States with foreign nations. Section 2’s preemptive effects extend no 
further than prescribed by § 1.
227. Indeed, if § 201 of Chapter 2 of the FAA does not incorporate the Convention, and 
Article II of the Convention is enforceable in federal courts only by reason of § 2 of the FAA, 
applied through § 208’s saving clause, then the same issues arise in federal court.
228. See infra p. 75.
229. 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5–6.
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ancillary provisions to facilitate enforcement of the Convention in federal 
courts.230 This is the most natural reading of Section 201’s language, which 
provides that “the Convention . . . shall be enforced in United States courts
in accordance with this Chapter.” This is a formula declaring that it is the 
substantive terms of the Convention itself, as a self-executing treaty, that are 
“enforced in U.S. courts” rather than the terms of a federal statutory 
provision.”231
This is also the most straightforward approach to the Convention—
simply treating it as the supreme Law of the Land, in both federal and state 
courts, rather than leaving the recognition of international arbitration 
agreements to a checkerboard of uncertain standards, some of which fairly 
clearly do not satisfactorily implement the Convention’s terms. As outlined 
above, the various permutations of U.S. arbitration law that would result 
from treating the Convention as non-self-executing are complex and 
uncertain (involving various possible combinations of Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2 of the FAA and state law).232 These complexities defy accessible 
description and are illustrated in Appendix A. As noted above, it is difficult 
to imagine that the United States—in ratifying a treaty intended to provide 
uniform international standards to enforce international arbitration 
agreements more effectively and efficiently—would have intended such 
uncertain and unsatisfying results.
Unsurprisingly, but importantly, this is also exactly the conclusion that 
state courts have reached. They have consistently applied the Convention 
directly in state court proceedings, a result that can only be reached, given 
the terms of Chapter 2 of the FAA, if the Convention is self-executing.233 As 
230. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
231. This conclusion has force with respect to Article II of the Convention. Unless the 
Convention were self-executing, it is very difficult to see how Article II would be “enforced in 
United States courts” because nothing in Chapter 2 of the FAA further implements the 
substantive provisions of that Article. Moreover, § 208 provides that Chapter 1 of the FAA 
applies to actions under Chapter 2 only to the extent that Chapter 1 “is not in conflict with this 
chapter [2] or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 208 (2012) 
(emphasis added). The italicized phrase again indicates that it is the substantive terms of the 
Convention itself, not the FAA’s implementing legislation, that applies in U.S. courts.
232. As illustrated in Appendix A, if the Convention is self-executing, then its 
provisions apply identically in both state and federal courts – just as one would expect of a 
treaty. If, however, the Convention were not self-executing then a bewildering range of 
possible results arises under Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA.
233. See Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408 (N.Y. 1982) (Convention 
does not permit state courts to issue pre-arbitration orders of attachment); Basis Yield Alpha 
Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 980 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) 
(“motion court properly held that the purported document containing an arbitration clause did 
not meet the writing requirements of the New York Convention . . . .”); Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550–52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (same); Shah 
v. E. Silk Indus. Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (“[T]his arbitration is 
governed by the UN Convention, and pursuant to the terms thereof, we find that pre-judgment 
attachment is prohibited.”); Faberge Int’l Inc. v. Di Pino, 491 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (N.Y. App. 
160 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:115
one state court held, “[a]n arbitration agreement between residents of 
different countries is governed by the New York Convention . . . provided 
both countries are signatory nations to the Convention.”234 Or, in the words 
of another state court, “since the New York Convention applies, [the 
plaintiff] cannot raise an unconscionability defence to the enforcement of 
the arbitration clause against it.”235 In contrast, no state court appears to have 
held that the Convention is not self-executing.
Finally, the Charming Betsy presumption also argues in favor of 
treating the Convention as self-executing. The Charming Betsy canon 
provides that U.S. statutes are presumed not to conflict with the United 
States’ obligations under international law: “an act of Congress ought never 
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”236 The Charming Betsy presumption generally is 
not applied in considering the self-executing status of treaties.237
Nonetheless, the presumption ought, in principle, to apply in ascertaining 
legislative intentions in cases where Congress enacts implementing 
legislation in conjunction with the United States’ ratification of a treaty, 
such as with the New York Convention. The combined actions of the 
federal political branches in ratifying a treaty and enacting implementing 
legislation ought not to be interpreted as violating U.S. treaty obligations “if 
any other possible construction remains.” Indeed, one would expect that, in 
concluding a formal treaty and enacting implementing legislation, the U.S. 
political branches would be particularly attentive to ensuring that their 
combined actions comply with international law.238
Here, given the relatively clear limitations of Chapter 2 of the FAA to 
federal courts, compliance with U.S. obligations under the Convention 
requires interpreting the Convention as self-executing. If the Convention 
were non-self-executing, then state law would apply to a substantial number 
of international arbitration agreements and awards not involving U.S. 
Div. 1985) (pre-arbitration attachment is “unavailable by reason of the existing [state] case 
law and the UN Convention . . . .”); CanWest Glob. Commc’ns Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret 
Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 549, 562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that the arbitration agreements 
at issue “are subject to the [New York] Convention enforcement rules.”).
234. Lloyds Underwriters, 17 So.3d at 737. 
235. Composite Concepts Co. v. Berkenhoff GmbH, No. CA2009-11-149, 2010 WL 
2371991, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2010).
236. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (Charming Betsy presumption “has been a 
maxim of statutory construction , , , .”); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 
(1888) (“[T]he courts will always endeavor to construe [treaties and statutes] so as to give 
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either . . . .”). 
237. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 310 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
238. A treaty typically imposes more specific, clear-cut obligations than customary 
international law. Similarly, U.S. ratification of a treaty necessarily entails the political 
branches’ focus on U.S. obligations, which is not necessarily the case where enactment of 
legislation against the general backdrop of customary international law is concerned.
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foreign commerce in state courts, resulting in significant violations of the 
Convention by those courts. Moreover, even application of the domestic 
provisions of Section 2 of the FAA would result in material violations of the 
Convention by American courts. As the Charming Betsy presumption 
instructs, it is difficult to imagine that the federal political branches intended 
to materially violate the U.S.’s obligations in ratifying the Convention and 
enacting Chapter 2 of the FAA.
b. History of the Ratification of the New York Convention
The actions and statements of the U.S. political branches during the 
process of ratification further support the conclusion that the Convention is 
self-executing. Although these views are confused about some issues,239
they display a consistent recognition that the Convention would be 
applicable in both state and federal courts and that the Convention’s terms 
would produce materially different results from those under existing state 
arbitration legislation.240
Preliminarily, there is no indication in the U.S. ratification process that 
the Convention was considered non-self-executing. In particular, nothing in 
the 1958 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the New York Conference,241 the
1968 Report of the U.S. State Department to President Lyndon Johnson,242
or President Johnson’s Letter of Transmittal of the Convention to the 
Senate243 suggests that the Executive Branch viewed the Convention or any 
of its particular provisions as non-self-executing. Likewise, as discussed 
above, none of the legislative materials associated with Chapter 2 of the 
FAA, enacted in conjunction with ratification of the Convention in 1970, 
contain any such statement or suggestion on the part of Congress.244
In contrast, there are important affirmative indications of the 
Convention’s self-executing status. At the conclusion of the Conference, the 
U.S. Delegation advised against ratification of the Convention on the 
239. Among other things, statements by the State Department during the ratification 
process incorrectly suggested that the Convention was outside the federal treaty power, 
Delegation Report, supra note 8, at 116 (“Commercial arbitration does not lie within the 
traditional limits of the treaty power”); that the Convention would result in domestic awards 
made in one U.S. state being treated as “foreign” awards under the Convention in other U.S. 
states, id. at 111–12; and that the Convention would apply to domestic arbitration agreements. 
Id. at 112 (Article II would “extend the treaty rule to purely domestic contracts”).
240. There is virtually no evidence, apart from the text of the FAA and the testimony of 
Executive Branch officials to Congress, regarding the views of either the Senate or the House 
of Representatives. The limited comments from congressional members were directed almost 
entirely to extraneous matters, not relevant to the Convention’s status. The Senate devoted 
much of its attention to Ambassador Kearney’s rank and to the International Court of Justice’s
role in international affairs. See, e.g., 1970 Kearney Statement, supra note 175, at 8–9, 11–15.
241. Delegation Report, supra note 8, at 95. 
242. KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17.
243. S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 90–118 (1968).
244. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1–2 (1970).
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grounds that its provisions would override state law in a substantial number 
of states.245 In the words of the Delegation’s Report, “[t]he convention, if 
accepted on a basis that assures [meaningful advantages on the United 
States], will override the arbitration laws of a substantial number of States
and entail changes in State and possibly Federal court procedures”246 and 
“make rather substantial changes in United States domestic law.”247
Similarly, “the United States would be able as a constitutional matter to 
adhere to the convention without any reservations whatsoever, [but to] do 
so, however, would entail interference with the laws and judicial 
procedures of a substantial number of the States.”248
The Delegation concluded that neither the Executive Branch nor the 
Senate would support such results as a matter of either politics or policy.249
The Delegation also raised the possibility of a U.S. “federal-state” 
reservation under Article XI of the Convention, which would declare the 
Convention inapplicable where the law of a particular U.S. state conflicted 
with the Convention’s terms250 but ultimately rejected this as 
245. Delegation Report, supra note 8, at 112 (Article II “raises the greatest difficulty 
from the standpoint of United States law,” because “[t]his provision is in conflict with the 
laws of a majority of the States.”). The Delegation’s Report observed that a majority of state 
arbitration laws at the time provided that “a contract for the submission of future disputes to 
arbitration is held to be revocable by either of the parties at any time before the award is 
actually rendered” and that “[i]n fact, only 17 States have expressly recognized the 
irrevocability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes.” Id. The Delegation noted similar 
conflicts between state laws and Articles IV and V of the Convention. Id. at 112–13 (noting 
differing treatment of proof of awards (under Article IV) and exceptions to obligation to 
recognition (under Article V)).
246. Id. at 95 (emphasis added). The Delegation also concluded, less clearly, “[t]he legal 
situation . . . is plainly untenable, since adherence to the convention in a manner entailing full 
acceptance of the principle of irrevocability [as provided by Article II] would require so 
extensive an overriding of State laws.” Id. at 112 (emphasis added). In contrast to the 
statements quoted in text, this latter comment might arguably contemplate future legislative 
action to implement the Convention. In contrast, statements that the Convention “will . . .
override” state law and “make rather substantial changes” in U.S. law are fairly clearly 
statements that the Convention itself would have direct legal effects.
247. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 116 (Convention’s effects on state law make it doubtful that “any proposal for 
adherence on such a basis would prove acceptable to the Senate”); id. at 117 (United States 
could only adhere to Convention “in a meaningful and effective way” by accepting 
“substantial changes in United States domestic law” and “exacerbating Federal-State 
relations”).
250. Id. at 115 (“The United States would be required as a practical matter to exclude 
from coverage, by invoking the ‘federal state clause,’ arbitrations cognizable and awards 
enforceable under State law.”).
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impracticable.251 The Delegation therefore recommended “strongly” against 
U.S. signature or ratification of the Convention.252
The explicit basis for the Delegation’s recommendation was that, absent 
a reservation regarding state law, the Convention would “override,” “make 
rather substantial changes in,” or “entail interference with” the laws of a 
majority of the several States.253 In the Delegation’s view, these 
consequences of U.S. ratification were untenable. These views, which were 
central to the Delegation’s recommendation, rested on the premise that the 
Convention was self-executing. This is reflected in its references to 
“overriding” or “changing” state law. Particularly when considered in the 
context of Article XI of the Convention, addressing the Convention’s 
application in federal or non-unitary states,254 and in light of the fact that the 
Delegation considered, but rejected, a federal-state reservation, it is very 
difficult to avoid a conclusion that the Convention was understood by the 
Delegation to be self-executing.
Despite the Delegation’s negative views, the United States took steps a 
decade later, beginning in 1968, to ratify the Convention. Those steps 
occurred with the Delegation’s views regarding the Convention’s self-
executing status clearly in mind, in part because the Executive Branch 
needed to justify its reversal of the U.S. attitude toward the Convention.255 A
central element of the Executive Branch’s support for ratification of the 
Convention in 1968 and 1970 was its view that state arbitration law changed 
materially since 1958, with the result that U.S. ratification of the 
Convention would no longer have the sweeping impact on state law that the 
Delegation previously emphasized.256
Ambassador Kearney testified in 1968 that the Executive Branch 
carefully considered the Delegation’s previous concerns regarding “the 
extent to which this convention might change the law in the various States 
of the Union and the effect it might have on the State courts.”257 Responding 
to that concern, Ambassador Kearney did not say that these concerns were 
misplaced because the Convention would be non-self-executing or would 
251. Id. at 116 (noting possibility of “reservation specially adjusted to the United States 
federal system” but rejecting this possibility on multiple grounds, including that adherence 
“on the basis for the ‘federal state clause’” would “be of little practical value”).
252. Id. at 115 (“Delegation recommends strongly that the United States not sign or 
adhere to the convention”).
253. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
254. See supra p. 6.
255. See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 6 (“[The] situation has changed 
rather dramatically over the past 10 years”); H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1–2 (1970).
256. 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 4 (“[T]he judicial attitude has now 
changed in partial consequence, at least, of the widespread enactment of statutes which in 
varying degrees declare arbitration agreements to be irrevocable and provide for their specific 
enforcement.”); id. at 7 (1968) (“[T]here have been a number of other changes in State law 
which support the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate in the future.”).
257. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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not have effects on state law. Instead, he explained that the adoption of the 
Uniform Arbitration Act in a number of states in the years following 1958, 
combined with other developments in state arbitration law,258 meant that 
concerns about the Convention’s impact on state law were now much more 
limited than they had been in 1958:
[A]s compared to 10 years ago when our delegation felt there was a 
majority of State law opposed to the general theory of the 
convention this is now completely reversed, and there is a 
substantial majority of State law in favor of it and this will continue 
to increase.259
As a consequence, in contrast to the situation in 1958, ratification of the 
Convention would no longer result in dramatic changes in the law in a 
substantial majority of the States. Instead, state law now prescribed rules 
that were materially more similar to those of the Convention than in 1958, 
thereby significantly reducing the policy and political objections raised by 
the Delegation’s Report. Relatedly, Ambassador Kearney also raised—but 
firmly rejected—the possibility of a U.S. reservation limiting the effect of 
the Convention to federal courts260 (as also had occurred when such a 
reservation was considered in 1958).261
The most reasonable interpretation of these actions is that the Executive 
Branch continued to understand in 1968 and 1970, as the U.S. Delegation 
understood in 1958, that the Convention would be self-executing. There are 
reasonably clear statements to this effect in the ratification process in 1968 
258. Id. at 6 (“At that time the delegation said in its report that there were, I think, some 
25 [sic] States whose laws might be affected by the convention. That situation has changed 
rather dramatically over the past 10 years. For one thing, the Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws was just around this time introducing its uniform law on arbitration 
procedures, and this uniform law has been and is being accepted by an increasing number of 
States, and the uniform law, in effect covers all of the requirements for internal U.S. practice 
which are contained in the convention for foreign problems.”).
259. Id. at 7. Ambassador Kearney also testified that, contrary to the views of the U.S. 
Delegation in 1958, it was clear that arbitration agreements affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce were within the federal government’s authority. 1970 Kearney Statement, supra
note 175, at 7 (“In the Prima Paint Case . . . , however, the Supreme Court made it quite clear 
that arbitration agreements relating to interstate or foreign commerce were fully within the 
ambit of Federal Law.”).
260. KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 22 (“It would, however, run counter to 
the express provisions of [Article XI] for the United States to seek to take advantage of its 
provisions with respect to foreign arbitral awards arising out of the commercial relationships. 
The Federal Arbitration Act . . . and the decisions of U.S. Courts relating thereto show that 
legislation on arbitration is clearly within the competence of the Federal Government.”); see 
also KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 34 (1968) (“In addition to the ground that you 
mention, there is Article XI of the Convention which would permit our Government to limit 
its adherence to the federal jurisdiction.”).
261. See supra p. 56.
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and 1970262 and no contrary statements. Moreover, the Executive Branch 
devoted careful attention to the Delegation’s Report and its concerns about 
the Convention’s effects on state law. This branch responded not by 
disagreeing or suggesting that the Convention would have no effect on state 
law, but by emphasizing the developments in state arbitration law since 
1958, which brought U.S. law more closely into line with the Convention’s 
provisions. It was this changed attitude of the several states toward 
arbitration that the Executive Branch saw as providing the political and 
policy basis for a change in U.S. attitude toward the Convention.263 At the 
same time, however, the Executive Branch’s analysis also made clear that, 
while many state laws changed, there remained a non-trivial number of 
states (at least 14) whose arbitration law was still inconsistent with the 
Convention in 1968.264 Thus, unless the Convention were regarded as self-
executing, the limited scope of Chapter 2 of the FAA and the content of 
these state arbitration laws would have left the United States in breach of its 
obligations under the Convention, a result that both the 1958 Delegation and 
the Executive Branch in 1968 and 1970 firmly rejected.
Equally important, the Convention’s self-executing status also 
dissuaded the United States from making a “federal-state” reservation to the 
Convention, despite considering the possibility265 and a material number of 
states whose arbitration law still conflicted with the Convention. As 
discussed above, if the Convention were not self-executing, and the United 
States made no Article XI reservation, then the existence of some state laws 
that conflicted with the Convention would have put the United States in 
immediate violation of its treaty obligations.266 Simply put, the Executive 
Branch concluded that the impact of the self-executing Convention on state 
law in 1970 would be less sweeping than in 1958 and therefore politically 
acceptable. The Convention’s self-executing status would, at the same time, 
ensure U.S. compliance with the treaty, thereby making a reservation under 
Article XI unnecessary to ensure U.S. compliance with the treaty. Again, 
262. See, e.g., KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 18 (“The purpose of [Article II] 
is to provide an appropriate treaty rule with respect to agreements to arbitrate.”) (emphasis 
added); 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 8 (“[W]ith respect to the filing of an action 
in a court without going through the arbitral procedure, if you have agreed to the arbitral 
procedure, the convention only requires the court to reject the suit and to refer the party back 
to arbitration.”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (“Another aspect of concern to the delegation was 
the extent to which this convention might change the law in the various States of the Union 
and the effect it might have on the State courts.”) (emphasis added).
263. See supra p. 57. The State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private 
International Law included representatives of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, but there was no reported objection to the Convention or its self-
executing status from the Conference.
264. See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 7 (1968) (stating that thirty-six 
states provided for enforcement of agreement to arbitrate future disputes).
265. See supra notes 250–51, 260 and accompanying text. 
266. See supra pp. 44, 54.
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the most sensible explanation for these actions was an understanding that 
the Convention was self-executing.
Finally, it seems very unlikely that the federal political branches 
intended the Convention to be non-self-executing, applying only in federal 
(and not state) courts, with the possibility of removal of actions arising 
under the Convention to federal courts (under § 205 of the FAA) providing 
the only avenue for U.S. compliance with its obligations under the 
Convention. That approach contradicts all of the analysis above—of the text 
and purposes of Article II, the character of the Convention, and the 
ratification history of the Convention—which fairly clearly demonstrates 
that Article II is self-executing. Moreover, an approach that left Article II 
only enforceable in federal courts, coupled with rights to remove from state 
courts, would not comply with the Convention, which mandates that “[t]he 
court of a Contracting State . . . shall . . . refer the parties to arbitration”267
and “shall recognize arbitral awards . . . .”268 The Convention does not 
provide that “some” courts of the United States (that is, only federal courts 
or just some federal or state courts) must refer parties to arbitration and 
recognize arbitral awards; it provides that every court in a Contracting State 
must do so.
In particular, the Convention does not allow the United States to require 
parties to give up the benefits that state courts, state procedural rules, or 
other factors might, in particular circumstances, provide those parties as a 
price of obtaining the Convention’s protections. As noted above, state courts 
comprise the substantial majority of all American courts, and numerous 
cases involving the Convention are not removed from state courts269—
because parties not infrequently prefer state courts to their federal 
counterparts. In these cases, the Convention’s terms are clear, mandatorily 
requiring that all American courts, state and federal, refer parties to 
arbitration and recognize arbitral awards.270 Likewise, imposing 
requirements of removal from state to federal courts is inconsistent with the 
Convention’s fundamental objectives of providing for the prompt and 
efficient recognition of international arbitration agreements and awards 
without idiosyncratic local procedural hurdles and costs.271
267. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
268. Id. art. III (emphasis added).
269. See supra p. 53. 
270. Moreover, as noted above, treating the Convention as non-self-executing would 
also result in state law applying in federal courts to arbitration agreements and, arguably, 
awards that fall outside of Chapter 1’s jurisdictional scope. See supra p. 45. 
271. See supra Parts I.A–B. As discussed above, Article II(3) requires courts, when 
“seized of an action” subject to arbitration, to refer the parties to arbitration, ensuring that 
their dispute can be efficiently resolved. See supra Part II.B.1. Nothing permits courts of a 
Contracting State to instead refer a party, seeking to enforce an international arbitration 
agreement, to some other forum or court. Similarly, Article IV was designed expressly to 
permit prompt, efficient recognition of awards. See supra Part I.B.2. Again, nothing permits 
courts of Contracting States to instead refer parties to other forums for recognition. 
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Moreover, Article XI of the Convention is impossible to reconcile with 
application of the Convention in some (federal), but not all (state), courts of 
a Contracting State. Under Article XI(b), if a federal state cannot implement 
the Convention in constituent states, it must immediately give those states 
notice of the Convention and favorably recommend that they adopt the 
Convention.272 It is very difficult to see how this provision would permit the 
United States simply not to implement the Convention in state courts, 
notwithstanding the legislative authority under the U.S. Constitution to do 
so,273 and also not make any recommendation that states take steps to 
implement the Convention. Again, the Executive Branch’s deliberate 
consideration, and rejection, of the possibility of an Article XI reservation 
argues decisively against the notion that the United States intended to 
comply with the Convention in federal, but not state, courts.
More fundamentally, the proposition of a U.S. treaty that would apply 
in federal courts, but not state courts, contradicts both the text and the 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause and instead produces a balkanized 
treatment of U.S. treaties that is the exact opposite of what the Framers 
generally contemplated with respect to the Nation’s international 
obligations.274 That same proposition also contradicts the basic objectives of 
the Convention to ensure the application of uniform and harmonized 
international rules to arbitration agreements275 by further balkanizing the 
Convention even within one Contracting State.
Indeed, the suggestion that the Convention applies only in federal and 
not state courts would produce a unique approach toward implementation of 
a U.S. treaty, which has apparently never been adopted for any other U.S. 
treaty or international agreement. At a minimum, if such an unusual 
approach was intended, it surely would have been discussed in the 
legislative history of the FAA and ratification history of the Convention. 
Instead, there is no mention whatsoever in either source that this approach 
toward compliance with the Convention’s terms was ever considered, much 
272. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. XI(b); see supra p. 6.
273. In any event, it is very doubtful that the United States could in fact rely on Article 
XI(b), because of the scope of the federal treaty power, which clearly extends to international 
commercial arbitration. This was apparent to the federal political branches in 1968 and 1970. 
See Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 108; KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 
22.
274. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“[A]rticles of treaties, as well as the law of nations, will always be expounded in one sense 
and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in 
thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be 
consistent . . . .”); John Jay, Continental Congress (Apr. 13, 1787), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 589, 590 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (finding 
it “irrational” to claim that “the same Article of the same treaty might by law be made to mean 
one thing in New Hampshire, another thing in New York, and neither the one nor the other of 
them in Georgia.”). 
275. See supra Parts I.A–B.
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less implemented. On the contrary, as discussed above, the FAA’s 
legislative history clearly reflects the opposite understanding and 
expectation—that the Convention would apply in state courts.276
In sum, the history of the Convention’s ratification in the United States 
does not suggest that the Convention is non-self-executing and instead 
decisively supports the opposite conclusion. There are no statements in the 
ratification history that the Convention is non-self-executing. Instead, 
Chapter 2 provides ancillary jurisdictional and procedural provisions 
applicable in federal courts based on the premise that it is the Convention’s 
substantive terms themselves that will be enforced in accordance with these 
ancillary provisions. Likewise, Chapter 2 does nothing to make the 
Convention applicable in state courts—a result which strongly indicates that 
the Convention must have been regarded as self-executing in order for U.S. 
state courts to comply with the United States’ obligations under the 
Convention.
4. Position of the U.S. Government
The self-executing nature of Article II of the Convention in the United 
States is also confirmed by the position of the U.S. government. It is well-
settled that the Executive Branch’s understanding of a treaty to which the 
United States is a party is “entitled to great weight” in the interpretation of 
the treaty by U.S. courts, including in assessing whether the treaty is self-
executing.277 The Supreme Court frequently defers to the Executive 
Branch’s interpretation of treaties and has explained that “[r]espect is 
ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the 
meaning of an international treaty.”278 Federal appellate courts and the 
276. See supra Part II.B.3.
277. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008) (citing U.S. government amicus 
curiae brief in considering the relevant treaty’s status); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 
(2010) (“It is well settled that the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty is entitled to 
great weight.”) (internal quotation omitted). Compare infra note 278.
278. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999); see also
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (“[T]he meaning given [to treaties] by 
the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is 
given great weight.”); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85, n.10 
(1982) (deferring to Executive Branch’s interpretation of treaty). 
Commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court may afford less deference to the 
Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty in circumstances where the treaty’s interpretation 
is dispositive as to the Executive Branch’s authority. Sitaraman & Wuerth, Normalization,
supra note 88, at 1968–70; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–32 (2006) 
(declining to defer to Executive Branch’s interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, where this interpretation defined the President’s authority to use military 
commissions). This rationale does not apply to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of the 
Convention.
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Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States have 
adopted the same position.279
In amicus curiae submissions to the Supreme Court, the U.S. 
government expressed its view that “Article II of the Convention is self-
executing.”280 In so doing, the U.S. government emphasized that “[b]oth the 
mandatory nature of Article II(3)’s text, and its direction to the ‘court[s]’ 
(rather than to the governments) of the contracting States, suggest that the 
provision was intended to be immediately enforceable in domestic courts” 
and is, therefore, self-executing.281 The U.S. government also observed that 
“neither Article II(3) nor Article II(1) . . . appears to envisage that steps 
beyond ratification are necessary before the Convention creates binding 
obligations enforceable in domestic courts.”282 These considered views of 
the U.S. government argue again for the Convention’s self-executing status.
Other Contracting States have generally adopted the same view of the
Convention as the U.S. government. The UNCITRAL Secretariat published 
a report in 2008 addressing how Contracting States to the Convention have 
incorporated it into national law.283 Based on responses of 108 of the 142 
Contracting States (in 2008), the Secretariat reported that “[f]or a vast 
majority of States, the New York Convention was considered as ‘self-
executing’, ‘directly applicable’ and becoming a party to it put the 
Convention and all of its obligations in action.”284
These views of Contracting States support a conclusion that the 
Convention, and in particular Article II, is self-executing. As noted above, it 
279. See, e.g., CBF Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 72 n.6 
(2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the U.S. government’s interpretation of the Convention is 
“entitled to great weight”); Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez,, 863 
F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2017) (accepting the U.S. government’s position that “we owe particular 
deference to the interpretation [of a treaty and its enabling act] favored by the United States”); 
Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2016) (“It is also significant that the 
Executive Branch’s interpretation of the [treaty]—an interpretation ‘entitled to great 
weight’—accords with our own.”); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(noting the deference given to executive branch treaty interpretation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) 
(“Courts in the United States . . . will give great weight to an interpretation made by the 
Executive Branch.”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
280. Louisiana Safety Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 7.
281. Id. at 9.
282. Id.
283. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Survey Relating to the Legislative 
Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/656, at 5 (June 5, 2008).
284. Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). The Secretariat’s report does not further specify the 
number of Contracting States that regard the Convention as directly applicable in national 
courts. The UNCITRAL Secretariat also notes that “[f]or a number of other States, the 
adoption of an implementing legislation was required for the Convention to gain the force of 
law in their internal legal order.” Id. ¶ 11.
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is of course the intentions and understanding of the U.S. political branches 
that are decisive with regard to a treaty’s self-executing status.285
Nonetheless, the views of other Contracting States and the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat about the meaning of the Convention are also relevant in 
considering a treaty’s self-executing status, especially where the U.S. 
political branches have not indicated that a treaty is non-self-executing.286
The Supreme Court has emphasized, including in Medellín, the relevance of 
this type of “ ‘postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”287 Here, 
the U.S. government has expressed the same position regarding the 
Convention’s self-executing status as that of many other Contracting States, 
adding further weight to these conclusions.
5. Judicial Decisions
Although only a limited number of courts have addressed the issue, the 
self-executing character of Article II of the Convention is also supported by 
the weight of considered authority in U.S. federal and, even more 
decisively, state courts. Moreover, the conclusions of U.S. courts are 
consistent with the weight of well-reasoned authority from courts in other 
Contracting States.
The best-reasoned U.S. judicial analysis of Article II’s status is a 
concurring opinion in a Fifth Circuit case that considered whether the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that state law reverse-preempts federal 
law governing the validity of arbitration agreements in insurance policies.288
A majority of the Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether 
Article II is self-executing.289 The self-executing character of Article II was 
addressed, however, in a concurring opinion by Judge Edith Brown 
Clement, who concluded that “the plain text of Article II of the Convention 
compels a finding of self-execution.”290 She also emphasized that Article 
II(3) “is addressed to the courts of contracting States, not to the States 
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. See supra p. 26. 
287. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 
516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)); see also id. at 517 (“The lack of any basis for supposing that any 
other country would treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of their domestic 
law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so viewed in our courts.”); Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 384–85 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing decisions of other 
contracting states). The Medellín Court did not explain how the decisions of other contracting 
states, with different conceptions of self-executing status, were relevant to analysis of this 
issue under U.S. law, although it appears to have considered these decisions as relevant to the 
treaty’s interpretation, with the treaty’s meaning in turn being relevant to the U.S. political 
branches’ understanding regarding its status. 
288. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 587 F.3d 714, 732–
37 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 731 (majority opinion) (“[I]mplemented treaty provisions, self-executing or 
not, are not reverse-preempted by state law pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . .”).
290. Id. at 733 (Clement, J., concurring).
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themselves or to their respective legislatures” and that “[r]eferral to 
arbitration is mandatory, not discretionary[,]”291 concluding that “Article II 
of the Convention is self-executing and fully enforceable in domestic courts 
by its own operation. It is entitled to recognition as ‘the supreme Law of the 
Land’ under the Supremacy Clause.”292
Similarly, the weight of U.S. authority in other contexts applies Article 
II directly (albeit usually without discussion or analysis) to give effect to 
international arbitration agreements.293 This includes a substantial body of 
U.S. federal court authority holding that Article II limits the types of 
national law that may be applied to international arbitration agreements 
under the Convention.294 Other U.S. federal courts have directly applied the 
provisions of Article II requiring a “written” arbitration agreement.295
In contrast, the very limited U.S. federal authority concluding that the 
Convention is not self-executing is dated and rests on cursory reasoning. 
The only decision holding Article II as non-self-executing is the Second 
Circuit’s 1995 ruling in Stephens v. American International Insurance.296 As 
Judge Clement noted in Safety National, however, the panel of the Second 
Circuit that rendered this decision “undertook no textual analysis and set 
forth no reasons to support its conclusion.”297 Moreover, Stephens was 
291. Id. at 734–35. Judge Clement also observed that Article II’s directive to domestic 
courts “leaves no discretion to the political branches of the federal government whether to 
make enforceable the [arbitration] agreement-enforcing rule it prescribes; instead, that rule is 
enforceable by the Convention’s own terms.” Id. at 735. She reasoned that “[t]reaty provisions 
setting forth international obligations in such mandatory terms tilt strongly toward self-
execution.” Id.
292. Id. at 735–36 (footnote omitted). A dissenting opinion also argued that the 
argument that the Convention was self-executing had been waived and that, under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the FAA does not preempt state law enacted for regulating the 
business of insurance. Id. at 737–53 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
293. See, e.g., Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2005); 
InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003); Rhone Mediterranee Comagnia 
Francese di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazioni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54–55 (3d Cir. 1983); 
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982); I.T.A.D. Assocs. v. Podar 
Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., 501 F.2d 
1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974).
294. See supra p. 10.
295. See, e.g., Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.), 601 F.3d 329, 334–35
n.11 (5th Cir. 2010); Sphere Drake Ins. v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 
1994); Bitúmenes Orinoco S.A. v. New Brunswick Power Holding Corp., No. 05 Civ. 
9485(LAP), 2007 WL 485617, at *11–18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007); Chloe Z Fishing Co. v. 
Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1247–48 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Coutinho Caro 
& Co. U.S.A. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., No. 3:95CV2362 AWT, 2000 WL 435566, at *11 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 14, 2000); Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petrol. Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991).
296. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995). One district court 
assumed that the Convention is non-self-executing with no substantive analysis. See Foresight 
Energy, LLC v. Certain London Mkt. Ins., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1099 (E.D. Mo. 2018).
297. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, J., concurring).
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decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín, which prescribed 
the current standards for determining when treaty provisions are self-
executing and supports the conclusion that Article II of the Convention is 
self-executing.298
More importantly, a number of state courts have also applied the terms 
of Article II directly,299 which must result from the Convention’s status as a 
self-executing treaty.300 Moreover, in applying the Convention, U.S. state 
courts have frequently made it clear that it is the Convention—not Chapter 2 
of the FAA—that they are applying.301 The reasons include, among others, 
that “[a]n arbitration agreement between residents of different countries is 
governed by the New York Convention[,]”302 an international arbitration 
agreement is “subject to the [New York] Convention enforcement 
rules[,]”303 and “this arbitration is governed by the [New York] 
Convention . . . .”304 In contrast, much like federal courts, no reported U.S. 
state court decision holds the Convention non-self-executing. These state 
court decisions are of particular significance given that the self-executing 
character of the Convention has its most obvious and important 
consequences in state courts—where, as discussed above, Chapter 2 of the 
FAA does not apply.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín has occasionally been 
interpreted as suggesting that Article V of the Convention is non-self-
executing.305 Those interpretations are ill-considered: Medellín does not 
argue for the non-self-executing status of the Convention and, instead, is 
best read as confirming that the Convention is self-executing.306 Medellín 
did not, of course, involve the Convention; instead, it involved the effect of 
an International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) judgment in U.S. courts. In 
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 233–35.
300. As discussed above, Chapter 2 plainly does not apply in state (as distinguished 
from federal) courts. See supra pp. 39–43. As a consequence, state court applications of 
Article II must result from the Convention’s self-executing status. 
301. See supra notes 233–35.
302. Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
303. CanWest Glob. Commc’ns Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 549, 
562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
304. Shah v. E. Silk Indus. Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
305. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-5
reporters’ note b(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (stating, incorrectly, that 
“[i]n Medellín, the Supreme Court indicated that, in order for a treaty to have self-executing 
status, an express determination to that effect must be found either in the treaty itself or in a 
pronouncement by the Senate, and the New York Convention presents neither. Indeed, in 
dictum in Medellín, the Court went on to cite the New York Convention as an example of a 
non-self-executing treaty.”); id. § 1-2 reporters’ note a(iv) (stating, incorrectly, that “the 
Supreme Court listed FAA Chapter 2 as an example of legislation implementing a non-self-
executing treaty.”).
306. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
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addressing this issue, however, the Supreme Court referred briefly, and by 
analogy, to the FAA’s implementation of Article V of the Convention.307 In 
particular, the Court cited Chapter 2 of the FAA as one example of 
legislative action that illustrated the statement that “[t]he judgments of a 
number of international tribunals enjoy a different status because of 
implementing legislation enacted by Congress.”308
Initially, as the U.S. government has observed, this statement 
implicated only Article III of the Convention, which provides for the 
enforceability of foreign arbitral awards, not Article II, which addresses 
arbitration agreements;309 nothing in Medellín suggests that Article II of the 
Convention is non-self-executing. Moreover, the Court’s statement was very 
brief dictum—a sentence that reasoned by analogy about a different treaty 
than that which was before the Court and as to which the Court received no 
submissions or argument. It would make no sense for passing dicta of this 
sort to be elevated above the standards for determining self-executing status 
that the Court set out in Medellín (and which, as discussed above, mandate 
treating the Convention as self-executing).
Most importantly, the Medellín dicta does not in fact address whether 
the Convention is self-executing. Instead, the Court only observed that 
arbitral awards subject to the New York Convention enjoy a different status 
than ICJ judgments because of the implementing provisions of Chapter 2 of 
the FAA.310 That observation does not state that the Convention is non-self-
executing and instead only observes, correctly, that, unlike ICJ judgments, 
Convention awards are the subject of federal implementing legislation.311
Critically, however, the fact that the FAA implements the Convention in 
federal courts does not suggest that the Convention is non-self-executing. 
As discussed in detail above, a self-executing treaty may very well require 
or benefit from a degree of implementation to ensure that its provisions can 
be efficiently and effectively applied in domestic courts.312 Indeed, as also 
discussed above, the text of Chapter 2 confirms the self-executing status of 
the Convention by providing that it is the substantive terms of the 
Convention itself that apply in federal courts, while supplying ancillary 
jurisdictional and procedural provisions to ensure the effective application 
of those terms by federal courts.313 In sum, the Medellín Court’s observation 
307. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521–22 (2008).
308. Id. at 521.
309. See Louisiana Safety Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 9–10.
310. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521–22.
311. The Court’s observation regarding Convention awards is entirely consistent with 
the conclusion, set forth above, that Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the Convention in 
federal courts. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
312. See supra pp. 37–38; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
313. See supra pp. Part II.B.3.a. As previously discussed, § 201 of the FAA provides 
that the Convention shall be “enforced in United States courts in accordance with this 
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that Chapter 2 of the FAA gives Convention awards a different status than 
ICJ judgments is both correct but irrelevant to the Convention’s self-
executing status.
Finally, the views of U.S. courts regarding the self-executing status of 
Article II are not unique. Instead, they are consistent with holdings in other 
Contracting States, which, as noted above, may be relevant to the 
determination of a treaty’s self-executing status in the United States.314
Courts in a number of other Contracting States have held that the 
Convention is directly applicable in national courts, making observations 
similar to those relevant in determining whether a treaty is self-executing 
under U.S. law. For example, the Italian Corte di Cassazione held that the 
Convention
[C]reate[s] a fully autonomous micro-system, either because treaty 
provisions (in respect of both the requirements for enforcement of 
the foreign award and the grounds to oppose enforcement) prevail 
over the provision in the [Italian] Code of Civil Procedure, or 
because of the Convention’s completeness and self-sufficiency.315
Similarly, the Singapore High Court has referred to the “self-execution” 
regime that Article II(3) creates.316 Courts in Switzerland and Japan have 
also treated the Convention as self-executing, without the need for statutory 
incorporation into domestic law.317 These decisions, like the results of the 
UNCITRAL survey of Contracting States,318 provide additional, if indirect, 
confirmation for the conclusion that Article II is also self-executing as a 
matter of U.S. law.
chapter,” plainly giving the Convention (and Convention awards) a status not possessed by 
ICJ judgments. See supra p. 52.
314. See supra Part II.A.
315. Cass., 8 ottobre 2008, n. 24856, 34 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 644, 647 (It.) (emphasis
added).
316. See FirstLink Invs. Corp. Ltd. v. GT Payment Pte Ltd., [2014] S.G.H.C.R. 12, ¶ 19 
(Sing.) (“Art II(3) of the New York Convention . . . may be considered a self-executing 
provision which prescribes substantive rules of international law applicable to the formation 
and validity of [an] international arbitration agreement.”).
317. See, e.g., Tribunal fédérale [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Feb. 7, 1984, 110 DECISIONI 
DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE SVIZZERO [DTF] II 54 (Switz.) (reasoning that Article II of the 
Convention is directly applicable in Swiss courts); Elliott Geisinger, Implementing the New 
York Convention in Switzerland, 25 J. INT’L ARB., 691, 693 (2008) (“[N]o implementing 
legislation was necessary for the New York Convention to come into force in Switzerland. 
The New York Convention is thus applied as a self-executing treaty in the Swiss legal 
system.”); Yasuhei Taniguchi & Tatsuya Nakamura, Japanese Court Decisions on Article V 
of the New York Convention, 25 J. INT’L ARB., 857, 857 (2008) (arguing that Japanese courts 
directly apply Convention as self-executing under Japanese law).
318. See supra pp. 64–65. 
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C. Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the 
New York Convention Are Self-Executing
The foregoing analysis of Article II applies with nearly equal force to 
Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the Convention. Although there is limited 
authority on the question, it is relatively clear that Articles III, IV, V, and VI 
are self-executing for the same reasons that Article II is self-executing.
1. Text of Articles III, IV, V, and VI
Like the text of Article II, the language of Articles III, IV, V, and VI is 
mandatory. As discussed above, Article III provides that all Contracting 
States “shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them” in 
accordance with local procedural rules.319 Article V is equally mandatory, 
providing that recognition of an award may be refused “only if” one of the 
exceptions specified in Articles V(1) and V(2) is applicable.320 As discussed 
above, U.S. and other national courts have uniformly held that these 
provisions are mandatory.321
Articles III, IV, V, and VI are also plainly, if in somewhat different 
terms than Article II(3), directed specifically to national courts. Article III 
requires recognition of awards “in accordance with the rules of procedure of 
the territory where the award is relied upon . . . .”322 National courts—unlike 
other branches of government—characteristically recognize awards and 
apply procedural rules and thus are the only arm of government that can 
carry out this mandate. Similarly, Article IV is addressed to “application[s]” 
for recognition and the proof of awards.323 This directive again plainly 
references national court proceedings, where applications are typically 
made, and not executive or legislative bodies. Even more clearly, Article V 
repeatedly refers to the “competent authority” of the recognition forum, 
prescribing the circumstances in which those “authorities” may deny 
319. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III (emphasis added). Article III goes on 
to provide that there “shall” not be imposed more onerous conditions or fees for foreign 
awards than for domestic awards.
320. Id. art. V.
321. See supra note 43.
322. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III. Unsurprisingly, U.S. courts (but not 
executive or legislative authorities) have frequently applied Article III. See, e.g., Monegasque 
De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002); Fotochrome, Inc. v. 
Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 517–18 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The conclusion that we must enforce the 
award as a valid determination on the merits is mandated by the United Nations Convention, 
which provides in Article III . . .”); NTT DoCoMo, Inc. v. Ultra d.o.o., No. Civ. 
3823(RMB)(JFC), 2010 WL 4159459, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2010).
323. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. IV. Again, unsurprisingly, Article IV has 
been applied by U.S. courts (but not legislative or executive authorities). See, e.g., Czarina, 
L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004); China Minmetals 
Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2003); Karaha Bodas 
Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 
2003).
176 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:115
recognition of an award.324 Article VI is likewise directed to “competent 
authorit[ies]” and “authorit[ies],”325 which are permitted to “adjourn” their 
“decision on the enforcement of [an] award” and “order [a] party to give 
suitable security.”326 All of these references to “competent authorities” are 
again plainly to national courts and not to the executive or legislative 
branches.
Thus, as with Article II, Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the Convention 
are not only mandatory, but are also specifically directed to national courts, 
addressing classic judicial functions of “recognizing and enforcing” awards, 
applying “rules of procedure,” and deciding “applications.” These are 
hallmarks of self-executing treaties, pointing decisively toward treating 
Articles III, IV, V, and VI as self-executing.
Moreover, the text of the Convention’s provisions dealing with awards 
is complete and comprehensive. No additional provisions are required 
beyond those of Articles III, IV, V, and VI for the effective recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards. This is evident from the text of 
contemporary national arbitration statutes that repeat Articles III, IV, V, and 
VI verbatim. Articles 35 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law are 
representative examples,327 but other arbitration statutes are comparable.328
In each case, arbitration statutes merely repeat the text of the Convention’s 
provisions regarding recognition and enforcement of awards.329 As with 
Article II, these textual aspects of Articles III, IV, V, and VI argue strongly 
for the self-executing status of these provisions.
324. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V, ¶ 1 (“Recognition and enforcement of 
the award may be refused . . . only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought . . . . “), id. art. V, ¶ 1(e) (“The award . . . has been set 
aside or suspended by a competent authority . . . “), id. art. V., ¶ 2 (“Recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority . . . finds 
that . . .”) (emphases added). 
325. “Competent authorities” clearly refers to national courts, although it might also 
conceivably include other types of tribunals in some legal systems. In the U.S. legal system, 
however, it is very difficult to conceive what the term “competent authority” would refer to in 
addition to national courts. See BORN, supra note 1, § 26.01, at 3395 n.4 (“The term 
‘competent authority’ refers in particular to national courts.”); see also Drahozal, Convention,
supra note 14, at 113.
326. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. VI (“If an application for the setting 
aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent authority . . . the authority 
before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the 
decision on the enforcement of the award . . . .”).
327. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 134, arts. 35–36.
328. See, e.g., The Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 §§ 101–103 (Eng.); Arbitration 
Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 609, 33–34, ¶¶ 87–89 (H.K.); Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, 
No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE (1996) §§ 46–48; Arbitration Act 2002, c. 10, §§ 29–31 (Sing.).
329. A few national arbitration statutes go further and either incorporate the 
Convention’s provisions regarding arbitral awards by reference or provide for recognition and 
enforcement of awards in accordance with the Convention. See SR 291.435.1 (1987), art. 194 
(Switz.); The Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 §§ 100–103 (Eng.).
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2. Purposes of Articles III, IV, V, and VI
The purposes of the Convention also argue for treating Articles III, IV, 
V, and VI as self-executing. As discussed above, the Convention’s goals of 
uniform treatment of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards are best 
fulfilled by treating Articles III, IV, V, and VI as self-executing.330 Doing so 
reduces the risks of divergent national legislative and judicial application of 
the Convention, both by legislative and judicial action.331 Consistent with 
this, a decisive majority of Contracting States to the Convention regard its 
provisions—including Articles III, IV, V, and VI—as directly applicable in 
national courts.332
3. U.S. Ratification of the New York Convention
The history of U.S. ratification of the Convention and enactment of 
Chapter 2 of the FAA confirm the self-executing status of Articles III, IV, 
V, and VI. As with Article II of the Convention, this ratification history 
reflects an understanding that the Convention would override state law, 
thereby ensuring that the United States would comply with its obligations 
under the Convention to recognize and enforce foreign awards.
Preliminarily, Section 201 of the FAA confirms that the Convention is 
self-executing, providing that “the Convention . . . shall be enforced” in U.S. 
courts “in accordance with this chapter,” a prescription which rests on the 
premise that the Convention is self-executing and that it is therefore the 
Convention itself that applies in U.S. federal courts.333 Section 207 adopts 
the same approach for the recognition of awards. As discussed above, 
Section 207 provides that, “[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award 
falling under the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may 
apply” to a U.S. federal court for confirmation of the award and that the 
court “shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal 
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the 
Convention.”334 This text reflects Chapter 2’s basic approach of providing 
ancillary provisions for application of the Convention’s self-executing terms 
in U.S. federal courts, all on the express premise (reflected in the text of §§ 
201, 207, and 208335) that the Convention’s terms are self-executing and 
themselves applicable in U.S. courts.336
330. See supra Parts I.A–B.
331. See id.
332. See, e.g., Cass., 8 ottobre 2008, n. 24856, 34 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 644, 647 (It.);
S.T.S., Jan. 14, 1983, (11 Y.B. COMM. ARB., p. 523) (Spain); App. Milano, 3 maggio 1997, 4
Y.B. COMM. ARB. 284, 285 (It.). See supra pp. 64–65.
333. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (emphasis added).
334. Id. § 207.
335. See supra pp. 36–37.
336. This is confirmed by the absence of any reference in § 207 (or otherwise in Chapter 
2) to Articles IV and VI of the Convention, dealing with very significant issues of proof of the
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Moreover, Section 207 plainly applies only to the recognition of awards 
in federal courts.337 At the same time, the Supreme Court had not held in 
1970, when the Convention was ratified—and still has not held—that 
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA apply in state courts.338 By their terms, those
sections apply only to “courts of the United States,” making arguments that 
their provisions have preemptive effects in state courts difficult.339 State 
courts are divided on the question whether Section 9 or Section 10 of the 
FAA apply in state court; several such courts have held that they do not and 
that state law governs the vacatur and confirmation of awards in state 
courts.340
Thus, if the Convention is non-self-executing, the recognition of foreign 
awards in state courts would be subject only to state law in a number of 
states, a result that very likely would have been assumed in 1970 (prior to 
Southland v. Keating).341 Critically, however, state law regarding the 
recognition of awards in 1970 diverged in a number of states very 
significantly from the mandatory requirements of Articles III, IV, V, and VI 
of the Convention.342 Substantial differences continue to exist between state 
arbitral award and suspension of recognition proceedings. Compare New York Convention, 
arts. IV, VI, with 9 U.S.C. § 207. Just as Chapter 2 omits any provision providing for 
application of the substantive terms of Article II of the Convention, it also omits such 
provisions for Articles IV and VI.
337. See supra pp. 39–43.
338. See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04(B)(1)(e)(iv), at 160–65; Drahozal, Convention,
supra note 14, at 109; RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV.
ARBITRATION § 1-2 reporters’ note a(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018).
339. See supra pp. 39–43.
340. Currently, some states apply the FAA § 10 vacatur grounds, while other states 
apply state law. Compare U.S. Elecs., Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 891, 892 
(N.Y. 2011) (“As this matter affects interstate commerce, the vacatur of the arbitration award 
is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”), Vold v. Broin Assocs., 699 N.W.2d 482, 487 
(S.D. 2005), Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 865 (Idaho 1980), Hilton 
Constr. Co. v. Martin Mech. Contractors, Inc., 308 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Ga. 1983), Dowd v. First 
Omaha Secs. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Neb. 1993), Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 
375, 379 (Ala. 2009), and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Petrucci, 525 So. 2d 918, 921 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), with Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 114 A.3d 
37, 56–57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (vacating award under state vacatur standards; construed to 
be identical to FAA vacatur standards), State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 123 A.3d 660, 675 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (same), and Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 907 A.2d 550, 
569–76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (state law vacatur grounds not preempted by FAA; court still 
refused to apply de novo review provision). Many states have not addressed the issue. Cf.
Gary B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2001), § 13(A)(2)(f), at 892 (maintaining that the more appropriate 
interpretation is that sections 9 and 10, like section 2, apply in state courts). 
341. See supra pp. 43–44.
342. See Quigley, Accession by the United States, supra note 62, at 1057 (“In the United 
States, no state arbitration statute makes any provision for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards; therefore, there is no summary procedure to confirm an interstate or foreign award in 
the state courts.”) (footnote omitted); Aksen, American Arbitration Accession, supra note 23,
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law and the Convention today.343 Moreover, even if one were to assume that 
all of Chapter 1 of the domestic FAA, including Sections 9 and 10, applied 
in state courts to awards involving U.S. foreign commerce, there are 
significant differences between the standards applicable to awards under 
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA and Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the 
Convention.344 And, as discussed above, state law would continue to apply 
to awards that are subject to the Convention but not within U.S. foreign 
commerce under Section 1 of the domestic FAA.345
Because of the foregoing, if the Convention were non-self-executing, 
the political branches would have, in ratifying it, been placing the United 
States into either very serious breach (if state law applied to awards in state 
courts) or serious breach (if Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA applied in state 
courts). As with Article II of the Convention, it is difficult to imagine that 
this is what the federal political branches intended, 346 particularly given the 
Convention’s objectives of uniformity.347
Instead, the better and more straightforward conclusion is that the 
federal political branches understood that the Convention was self-
executing, with Chapter 2 only providing ancillary mechanisms for 
application of the Convention in federal courts. Consistent with this, there is 
no suggestion in either the Convention’s ratification process in the United 
States or the legislative history of Chapter 2 that Articles III, IV, V, and VI 
are non-self-executing.348 On the contrary, and again for the same reasons as 
at 10 (“[T]he only state with a modern arbitration statute that provides for the enforcement of 
foreign awards is Florida.”).
343. See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04(B)(1)(e)(iv), at 164.
344. Among other things, the differences between the Convention and the domestic 
FAA include: (a) the grounds for denying recognition of awards (with Articles III, IV and V 
of the Convention prescribing limited grounds for non-recognition that differ materially from 
those in § 10 of Chapter 1); (b) the existence of a requirement that parties agree in their 
arbitration agreement that the award shall be confirmed by court order (which is imposed by § 
9 of Chapter 1 of the FAA but not by the Convention); (c) the requirements for proof of the 
existence of a foreign award (imposed by Article IV of the Convention but not by Chapter 1 
of the FAA); and (d) differences in jurisdictional requirements, reciprocity reservations, non-
arbitrability exceptions, and federal policies favoring arbitration.
345. See supra pp. 50–51.
346. Finally, if the Convention were non-self-executing, there would also be uncertainty 
regarding its application in federal courts. It is unclear what provisions of Chapter 2 of the 
FAA would implement Articles II, III, IV and VI of the Convention. Section 207 of Chapter 2 
provides for implementation of Article V’s exceptions to the recognition of awards. See supra
p. 74. Nothing in Chapter 2 appears, however, to provide for similar implementation of 
Article II’s provisions for recognition of arbitration agreements or of Articles III, IV and VI 
with respect to awards. Arguably, § 201’s general provision that the Convention shall be 
enforced in accordance with Chapter 2 of the FAA provides for the application of the
substantive terms of Articles II, III, IV and VI, but, as discussed above, this is difficult to 
reconcile with § 207’s specific implementation of Article V’s exceptions or with the text of § 
201 (which is not readily interpreted as incorporating the Convention’s terms). See id.
347. See supra Parts I.A–B.
348. See supra Part II.B.3.
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detailed above in the context of Article II, the ratification history of the 
Convention in the United States provides strong evidence that all of the 
Convention—including Articles III, IV, V, and VI—was regarded as self-
executing.349
* * * * * *
A concluding observation about the current draft of the Restatement of 
the U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration is 
necessary. The American Law Institute describes a Restatement’s objective 
as “explicat[ing] what the law is, or should be, in the area addressed” in 
order to “promote the clarification and simplification of the law.”350 Despite 
that objective, the Restatement takes no position on the self-executing status 
of the Convention, instead only commenting that the issue is 
“unresolved,”351 although also opining that, “[u]nder the requirements set 
forth in Medellín v. Texas . . . the Convention would have difficulty meeting 
the criteria of a self-executing treaty.”352
The Restatement’s failure to resolve the Convention’s status beyond its 
general expression of doubt is surprising: as detailed above, the text of the 
Convention, its ratification history, and other factors argue decisively that 
the Convention’s provisions are self-executing.353 The Restatement
unhesitatingly states U.S. law on other topics, often in the absence of 
Supreme Court or other clear authority,354 and it is anomalous that the 
Restatement does not do so with respect to the Convention’s status.
The Restatement’s silence is particularly surprising—and also 
unfortunate—because of the foundational character of the Convention’s 
status. Unless one answers the question whether the Convention is self-
executing, it is impossible to go on to “restate” the law governing 
international arbitration in American courts in a principled manner. The 
uncertain and unsatisfying results of leaving this foundational issue 
unresolved, set forth in Appendix A, again illustrate this point. At a 
minimum, the Restatement’s approach is a missed opportunity to assist in 
349. See id.
350. The American Law Institute describes its objectives in AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING 
THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND 
THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 1–2 (2015). 
351. RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2
reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018); id. § 1-5 reporters’ note 
b(iv) (“[B]ecause it is not necessary for this Restatement to take a position on whether the 
New York Convention is self-executing, it does not do so.”). 
352. Id. § 1-5 reporters’ note b(iv); see also supra pp. 48–49.
353. See supra Parts II.B–C.
354. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV.
ARBITRATION § 1-5 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (providing annulment 
standards for non-domestic awards made in the United States).
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clarification of a critical aspect of the law governing international arbitration 
in American courts.
The Restatement attempts to remedy its silence regarding the 
Convention’s status by fashioning a set of substantive rules governing 
arbitration agreements and awards, which are assertedly applicable in both 
federal and state courts, even if the Convention were non-self-executing. 
The Restatement creates two constructs separately addressing arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards.
First, the Restatement asserts that the domestic FAA prescribes 
“essentially equivalent” standards to those of Article II of the Convention, 
proceeding on the basis that the Convention’s status is irrelevant insofar as 
the recognition of international arbitration agreements is concerned.355 The 
Restatement then goes on to base its substantive rules governing arbitration 
agreements, applicable identically in both U.S. state and federal courts, in 
significant part on Section 2 of the domestic FAA.356 Second, the 
Restatement postulates that Section 207 of the FAA is applicable in state 
courts,357 thus assertedly providing a statutory as opposed to a treaty basis 
for the recognition of awards pursuant to the Convention’s standards in state 
courts; this enables the Restatement to proceed on the basis that the grounds 
for recognition of foreign and non-domestic awards in both state and federal 
courts are those prescribed by the Convention.358
Putting aside their unfortunate failure to confirm the Convention’s self-
executing status, both of the Restatement’s positions are very difficult to 
accept as plausible statutory interpretations of the FAA. Both positions are 
also bad policy: they aggravate the problems resulting from failure to 
resolve the Convention’s self-executing status, would place the United 
States out of step with other Contracting States to the Convention, and miss 
an opportunity to enhance the Convention’s efficacy.
First, the Restatement’s approach to international arbitration agreements 
is inconsistent with existing U.S. authority. The Restatement’s suggestion 
that the domestic standards of Section 2 of the FAA are “essentially 
equivalent” to the international standards of the Convention is surprising, 
because it presumes that a domestic U.S. statute, enacted in 1925, produces 
“essentially” the same rules as an international instrument negotiated with 
limited U.S. participation in 1958. Even apart from that inherent 
355. Id. § 1-2 reporters’ note a(iv) (“[W]hether Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention is self-executing does not affect the scope of FAA preemption because as 
construed in the Restatement . . . the Article II defenses to enforcement of international 
arbitration agreements are essentially equivalent (subject to differences in the applicable law) 
to the defenses applicable under the savings clause of FAA § 2.”).
356. Id. § 1-2 reporters’ notes b(i), (ii); id. §§ 2-12 to 2-20 (citing, interchangeably, U.S. 
decisions under Chapter 1 of the FAA and decisions under the Convention). 
357. Id. § 1-5, cmt. b (“FAA § 207 thus applies to both federal courts and state courts, 
and makes the grounds in Article V of the New York Convention applicable in both federal 
court and state court.”). 
358. Id. § 1-5, cmts. a, b.
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implausibility, the suggestion of “essential equivalence” is incorrect because 
it ignores multiple, substantial differences between the Convention and the 
domestic FAA, which, as discussed above, have been applied consistently 
by U.S. courts.359 Relatedly, the Restatement’s suggestion also rests on the 
faulty presumption that Section 2 of the FAA applies to all arbitration 
agreements and awards that are subject to the Convention. As discussed 
above, that is incorrect because the jurisdictional scope of Section 1 of the 
FAA is significantly more limited than that of the Convention, thus leaving 
substantial numbers of international arbitration agreements and awards 
subject only to state law—and not the federal standards of Section 2 of the 
FAA—in state (and possibly federal) courts.360
More fundamentally, the Restatement’s approach should not be what 
U.S. law provides: the Restatement substitutes domestic U.S. standards—or, 
more accurately, a sui generis amalgamation of domestic and international 
standards—in place of the terms of the Convention in a manner that 
contradicts the treaty’s basic objectives.361 That approach would require 
ignoring the separate text and purposes of both the domestic FAA, 
applicable under Chapter 1 to domestic arbitration agreements, and the 
Convention, applicable under Chapter 2 and the Convention itself to 
international arbitration agreements, instead amalgamating two separate 
instruments into a new corpus of general arbitration law. Neither the 
Convention nor the FAA provide for, or should provide for, such an 
approach. The better approach is that which courts in other countries have 
adopted,362 which the UNCITRAL Model Law prescribes363 and U.S. state 
359. See supra pp. 47–50. Relatedly, the Restatement also ignores, and contradicts, the 
largely unanimous body of U.S. authority that applies different standards to international 
arbitration agreements, subject to the Convention, than to domestic arbitration agreements, 
subject to Chapter 1. See supra pp. 48–49. 
360. See supra pp. 51–52.
361. See supra Parts I-A–B.
362. See, e.g., Milano Trib., 8 gennaio 1990, 17 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 539, 539–40 (It.) 
(“[The arbitration] clause . . . meets the requirement of Art. II of the [Convention] . . . . The 
further requirement of a specific approval of the clause in writing, provided for in Art. 1341 
CC: is not necessary for the arbitration clause to be valid. According to Art. 26 of the 
Preliminary Provisions to the CC; the clause is regulated by Italian law only as far as the 
Italian law is not derogated from by the said international Convention, which does not provide 
for such a specific approval.”) (footnotes omitted); Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser 
Aluminium Tech. Serv., Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552, ¶ 149 (India) (“The underlying motivation of 
the New York Convention was to reduce the hurdles and produce a uniform, simple and 
speedy system for enforcement of foreign arbitral award. Therefore, it seems to be accepted 
by the commentators and the courts in different jurisdictions that the language of Article 
V(1)(e) referring to the “second alternative” is to the country applying the procedural law of 
arbitration if different from the arbitral forum and not the substantive law governing the 
underlying contract between the parties.”).
363. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 2A(1); see also BORN, supra note 1, § 
1.04(A)(1)(e), at 117.
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courts have held the Convention requires:364 international arbitration 
agreements are governed by the mandatory international terms of the 
Convention, regardless of what rules and policies apply to domestic 
agreements under Chapter 1 of the domestic FAA.
Second, the Restatement’s approach to the recognition of arbitral 
awards is also flawed. Contrary to the Restatement’s suggestions, Section 
207 of the FAA is applicable only in U.S. federal, not U.S. state, courts; 
there is no tenable way to interpret Chapter 2 of the FAA to reach the 
Restatement’s apparent conclusion.365 As a result, if the Convention were 
non-self-executing, the standards applicable to the recognition of foreign 
and non-domestic awards would differ materially between federal and state 
courts. Among other things, as discussed above, Article IV’s standards of 
proof of awards and Article V’s narrow and exclusive grounds for non-
recognition of awards would not apply in U.S. state courts. Instead, 
materially more demanding standards of proof and more expansive and non-
exclusive grounds for non-recognition would apply in state courts, with 
different standards likely applicable in each of the several states.366
These results, which the Restatement’s approach would produce, are
both unsatisfactory and implausible. They are unsatisfactory because the 
existence of two—or fifty-one—materially different legal regimes for the 
recognition of international arbitral awards in American courts contradicts 
the basic objectives of both the Convention and the Supremacy Clause. That 
is particularly true where a number of those legal regimes (in those states 
with archaic arbitration legislation) are plainly contrary to U.S. 
commitments under the Convention. For the same reasons, these results are 
also implausible. Both the Charming Betsy presumption and the federal 
political branches’ stated intention to faithfully implement the Convention 
underscore that conclusion.
364. See supra notes 233–35.
365. The Restatement asserts: “Section 207 applies to ‘any court having jurisdiction 
under’ FAA Chapter 2, which includes but is not limited to federal courts . . . FAA § 207 thus 
applies to both federal courts and state courts, and makes the grounds in Article V of the New 
York Convention applicable in both federal court and state court.” RESTATEMENT OF U.S.
LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-5 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 6, 2018). The Restatement’s assertion that “any court having jurisdiction under this 
chapter” includes state courts is wrong. Sections 202 and 203 provide grants of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction to “the district courts of the United States,” not to state courts. 9 U.S.C. § 
203 (2012). Nothing in Chapter 2 grants state courts jurisdiction over actions arising under the 
Convention. Likewise, the Restatement’s interpretation of § 207 would also mean that § 206 
(regarding appointment of arbitrators and orders compelling arbitration) applies in state courts 
(which plainly was not intended). There is also no indication in Chapter 2’s legislative history 
that any such results were intended, with the Executive Branch instead repeatedly testifying 
that Chapter 2 would not “have any effect whatever on state laws” and that the chapter 
“concerns in effect solely the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts.” 1970 Kearney 
Statement, supra note 175, at 10 (emphasis added).
366. See supra note 245.
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In sum, the Restatement’s current architecture of U.S. arbitration law 
rests on flawed foundations and produces unsatisfactory results. Instead of 
leaving the Convention’s status unresolved, the Restatement should have 
taken the opportunity to resolve that fundamental question and then to 
provide a restatement of the international rules that apply to international 
arbitration agreements and awards. In doing so, the Restatement could have 
contributed to the ongoing process—in which U.S. courts historically have 
played a central role—of interpreting the Convention and providing a robust 
international legal framework for international arbitration.
Conclusion
The New York Convention is the world’s most successful private 
international law treaty. The Convention provides the framework for 
resolution of a substantial proportion of all international commercial 
disputes over the past half century and the foundation for greatly-expanded 
international trade and investment. Central to the Convention’s success is 
the prescription of uniform international rules governing the recognition of 
international arbitration agreements and awards.367
Only limited attention has been devoted to the question whether the 
Convention is self-executing in the United States. Nonetheless, this issue is 
of considerable importance to the continued success of the Convention, both 
in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States, it is critical that the 
Convention be regarded as self-executing, as most U.S. courts have held or 
assumed. As discussed above, unless the Convention is self-executing, 
nothing in the FAA (or otherwise) makes its terms applicable in state 
courts—an unsatisfactory result that would place the United States in 
material breach of its international obligations—while important provisions 
of the Convention would arguably not apply in U.S. federal courts.
Moreover, the Convention’s status as a self-executing treaty plays a 
highly important role in ensuring that the Convention’s objective of 
prescribing uniform and harmonized international rules governing the 
recognition of international arbitration agreements and awards is achieved. 
If the Convention itself is not applicable in national courts, and instead is 
only mediated through individual and divergent national or state laws, then 
the essential objectives of uniformity and harmonization are inevitably 
frustrated. That is graphically illustrated by the treatment of the 
Convention’s terms in the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International 
Commercial and Investment Arbitration, which provides that the 
Convention is implemented in U.S. state courts through a sui generis
combination of Section 2 of the domestic FAA and Section 207 of Chapter 
2 of the FAA, and which would result in the application of substantive rules 
differing materially from those applicable under the Convention.
367. See supra Parts I.A–B.
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The uniform interpretation of the Convention is particularly important 
because the Convention does not contain any mechanism for resolving 
disputes over its interpretation and instead depends on the interpretations of 
national courts. In order for the Convention to be interpreted and developed 
in a uniform manner, it is important that the Convention’s terms, and not the 
provisions of divergent municipal arbitration statutes, be applied. Treating 
the Convention as non-self-executing would threaten to balkanize its terms, 
with courts and legislatures in different Contracting States adopting 
inconsistent applications of the language of individual implementing 
statutes and, inevitably, divergent understandings of the meaning of the 
Convention itself. It is important to the Convention’s continued role in 
providing an effective legal framework for international arbitration that the 
Convention be treated as self-executing, with U.S. and other national courts 
interpreting the same text and not divergent national statutory enactments.
Despite the uncertainty of some authorities, the text, purposes, and 
history of the Convention all argue decisively for treating both Article II of 
the Convention—dealing with international arbitration agreements—and 
Articles III, IV, V, and VI—addressing awards—as self-executing. That 
conclusion is confirmed by the interpretations of the Convention that 
national courts and other authorities have adopted, as well as by the terms of 
national arbitration legislation in Contracting States other than the United 
States. The Convention’s self-executing status ensures that the Convention 
will be fully applicable in American courts, both state and federal, and that 
the Convention’s objective of uniformity can be fulfilled, providing the 
basis for national courts to work together in applying the Convention and 
developing the international rules that it prescribes. This collaborative role 
of national courts, implementing the Convention’s international terms, has 
been an important element of the Convention’s success over the past sixty 
years and is equally important to its success in coming decades.
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for Agreements in “Foreign 
Commerce”; No 
Incorporation or Preemption 










State law* State law*
? §§2, 3, and 4 Apply to 






State Law State Law
Fall 2018] The New York Convention 187
? §207 Incorporates 
Convention, Arts. III, IV, and 
V in Federal Courts
? No Incorporation or 
Preemption for Agreements 
or Awards in State Courts
State law*
IV and V
? §§2, 3, and 4 Apply to 
Agreements in Federal Courts 
for “Foreign Commerce”
? §§9 and 10 Apply to Awards 
in Federal Courts for “Foreign 
Commerce”
? No Incorporation or 
Preemption for Agreements 
or Awards in State Courts
§§2, 3, 4 §§9 and 10
State Law State Law
State law* State law*
      * State law for agreements/awards not involving the “foreign commerce” of the United 
States
